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DEFAULT TERMINATION OF
DEFENSE DEPARTMENT
FIXED PRICE SUPPLY CONTRACTS
I
INTRODUCTION
The Government commonly reserves the right to termi-
nate military contracts at any time. If there is no defect
in the contractor's performance, the termination must be
issued "for the convenience of the Government." As a con-
sequence of such a termination, the contractor is entitled to
recover in settlement from the Government the costs he
has incurred toward the uncompleted portion of the con-
tract plus a profit thereon. Such a settlement under the
"termination for convenience" article frequently ap-
proaches but cannot exceed the amount of the contract
price.
When the contractor has failed to make timely delivery
or to perform some other provision of the contract, the
situation is altered. Within certain limitations the Govern-
ment then has the right to terminate the contract under
(189)
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the provisions of the "default" article. A default termina-
tion has two important effects: (1) it deprives the con-
tractor of the right to recover his costs under the "termina-
tion for convenience" article; (2) it permits the Govern-
ment to repurchase the supplies elsewhere and charge to
the account of the defaulting contractor the "excess costs"
- the amount by which the repurchase price exceeds the
original contract price.
These provisions are designed largely to facilitate ad-
ministrative cancellation and settlement of contract obliga-
tions without resort'to court action. They do not radically
alter the common law rights of the parties. There are, how-
ever, in the "default" article two provisions in the con-
tractor's favor which do represent a departure from the
common law. They are applicable in those cases where the
Government has terminated because of delays in delivery.
First, a detailed provision increases the number of causes
for delay which are deemed excusable and which will
prevent liability for excess costs of repurchase. Secondly,
by showing any such excuse for the delay, the contractor is
not merely relieved from liability for the excess costs, but
thereby becomes entitled to a settlement under the "termi-
nation for convenience" article for the expenses of his
attempted performance and, perhaps, a profit. Thus, a
contractor whose performance is long overdue at the time
of termination, by proving excuse, may not only be spared
liability for the loss to the Government on repurchase, but
may actually enjoy a profit although he has failed to deliver
a single item.'
Included in appendices to this article are standard pro-
visions relating to default and excusable delays. These
I Construction contracts do not ordinarily include a "termination for
convenience" article. What relief is available to a defaulted contractor
whose delays prove excusable does not seem clear. Perhaps a termination
for convenience settlement may be allowed administratively in lieu of
damages for which the Government would otherwise be liable. But cf.
Armed Services Procurement Regulations (hereafter ASPR) 8-703 (Aug.
6, 1953), CCH Gov'T. COaRACTs REP. fr 41,863, as to fixed price construction
contracts.
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provisions relate to supply contracts - Appendix A being
for fixed price and Appendix B for cost reimbursement
contracts. The text will deal with the fixed price contract
clause except where noted, although the principles are
generally the same. Clauses relating to default differ a good
deal in form and detail but are alike in their elimination of
certain risks of non-performance normally assumed by a
seller in the absence of express provision. Delay is excused
for such causes as strikes, material shortages, certain de-
faults of sub-contractors, and generally "causes beyond
the control and without the fault or negligence" of the
contractor.
It must not be supposed, however, that all departures
from commercial custom in the standard forms are in the
contractor's favor. The broader opportunity to prove ex-
cuse and the consequent right to recover costs through a
termination for convenience practically exhaust the charity
of the government draftsmen. The remainder of the many
provisions are in favor of the Government and are calcu-
lated to insure performance. First of all, the provision
permitting default termination for the slightest delay be-
yond the specified delivery time obviously makes time "of
the essence" in all contracts, even where. timely delivery
seems of little importance. Thus the contractor is held to a
higher standard of performance as regards time than in the
usual private contract where, absent any express provision,
the apparent urgency of the need for the goods would
govern the materiality of the delays in delivery.2 Secondly,
the Government has the right, under subsection a (ii) of
2 This view is in conflict with that suggested in an article appearing
in the Federal Bar Journal in 1954. The author made the curious observa-
tion that ". . . the current view is that time is not of the essence in
Government contracts unless it is apparent from all the facts and cir-
cumstances that time is a material factor." Corbin is cited as sole authority.
It was apparently overlooked that the very language of the default article
bestows power on the Government to terminate for any delinquency.
Corbin was concerned with private contracts containing no specific pro-
vision regarding timely delivery other than a mere delivery date. Risik,
Defaults in Federal Government Contracts, 14 FED. B.J. 339, 348 (1954).
See also RESTATEM=T, CONTRACTS § 276 (1932).
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the "default" article, to terminate the contract for default
even before the delivery date where the contractor's failure
to make satisfactory progress endangers performance and
is not cured after notice. A third advantage already noted
is the right of the Government to repurchase terminated
supplies elsewhere and simply charge the account of the
defaulted contractor with the excess costs that may be
involved and/or liquidated damages if such are provided.3
The authors propose to discuss the relative rights of
Government and contractor under the standard forms for
fixed price supply contracts in the following general areas:
(1) the conditions and limitations of the Government's
right to terminate for default; (2) the excuses entitling a
defaulted contractor to relief from excess costs and to a
termination for convenience; (3) the effect of the Govern-
ment's consenting to late deliveries on the right to termi-
nate; (4) problems relating to action following termina-
tion; and (5) remedies available to the Government other
than termination. The term "delinquency" will be used to
describe a situation where the contractor has failed to
deliver on time but has not yet been terminated. "Default"
will be used where termination has issued. The right to a
termination for convenience will be discussed, but the
complicated provisions for settlement under the "termina-
tion for convenience" clauses are beyond the scope of this
article.
There is no pretense that the discussion here will exhaust
the subject of default terminations. There are too many
Government entities involved with varying and times
3 Liquidated damages currently are seldom used in supply contracts
but are a standard provision in construction contracts.
4 A classic three-sided struggle among the Attorney General, the Comp-
troller General, and the Court of Claims appears in Graybar Elec. Co. v.
United States, 90 Ct. Cl. 232 (1940). See also McCabe v. United States, 84
Ct. Cl. 291 (1936); 2 Comp. Gen. 784 (1923). In one opinion the Comptroller
General has stated flatly that "While the accounting officers of the Gov-
ernment will give serious consideration to decisions of the Court of Claims,
they are not required to follow such decisions as precedent." 27 Comp.
Gen. 432 (1948), at 433.
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disputed jurisdiction.' There are too many complexities
in too many standard forms and too many permuta-
tions of fact in the blizzard of appeals from default
terminations. In the case of military contracts these appeals
are normally decided as questions of fact under the "dis-
putes" article by the Armed Services Board of Contract
Appeals (hereafter "ASBCA" or "Board"5 ). Until recently
the infrequency of judicial review was such that the
Board's decisions (together with those of the Comptroller
General) are the principal authority on defaults and will
be relied on most heavily in this article.' However, the
commentator dealing with the Board's opinions faces sev-
eral difficulties which give fair warning that conclusions
must be tentative on the question of authority. First, the
Board, in its primary role as a fact finding entity, frequent-
ly delivers opinions which are extremely terse in their con-
clusions. Long on facts and short on discussion, they often
present a serious problem of analysis. Furthermore, the
meaning of the occasional land mark case often is obscured
5 The Board derives its authority from a "disputes" article permitting
appeal to the secretary of the department (Army, Navy, or Air Force)
within 30 days from a written decision by the contracting officer. The
authority of the secretary or his representative (the Board) is limited
to questions of fact arising under the contract. Several issues commonly
arising under the standard forms and appearing to be mixed questions of
law and fact are made questions of fact by express provision. Although the
excusability of a contractor's delays is not explicity made a dispute of fact,
it has been treated as such by the Board through perhaps two thousand
decisions without challenge. For an excellent discussion of the history of
the "disputes" article and its recent legislative alteration, see Joy, The
Disputes Clause in Government Contracts: A Survey of Court and Ad-
ministrative Decisions, 25 Foanrma L. Rv. 11 (1956). See also Cuneo,
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals: Tyrant or Impartial Tribunal?
39 A.B.A.J. 373 (1953).
6 Until recently the "disputes" article made the decision of the Board
"final and conclusive" on questions of fact. In United States v. Wunderlich,
342 U.S. 98 (1951), factual questions determined under this clause were
held subject to judicial review only upon the basis of "fraud, alleged and
proved.' The resulting protest inspired legislative changes in the "disputes"
article, which now provides for review where the decision is "fraudulent
or capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply
bad faith, or is not supported by substantial evidence." 68 STAT. 81 (1954),
41 U.S.C. §§ 321, 322 (Supp. 1955). See Volentine and Littleton v. United
States, 145 F. Supp. 952 (Ct. Cl. 1956); Joy supra note 5.
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in later decisions where a melange of facts that almost de-
fies penetration may be followed by a laconic conclusion
citing the earlier opinion as precedent. A second difficulty
of analysis lies in that provision in the charter of the Board
which permits decisions to be made in some instances by
only two members of the sixteen member Board.! That
conflicts of principle may be generated within the Board
seems evident, and such conflicts make prediction hazard-
ous. Finally, and superimposed on these two problems, is
the very real difficulty created by the absence of any digest
of the Board's opinions since 1954. During the intervening
period several hundred opinions have issued, of which
but a small part are reported (and these inadequately)
in the Government Contract Service.a The rest remain
almost inaccessible because they are undigested and
unavailable in all but a few non-government collections.
There is, of course, some assistance to be had from opinions
of the Court of Claims and other federal courts and from
the opinions of administrative agencies. The occasional
decision sof the General Accounting Office and its princi-
pal officer, the Comptroller General, often exert a de-
termining influence on the solution of particular prob-
lems. But the greater number and coverage of the Board's
decisions and the relative paucity of appeals leave it, the
most persistent voice and in effect chief authority in the
area.
7 The Board's charter, granted by directive of the three secretaries on
May 1, 1949, divides the organization into three panels (Army, Navy, Air
Force) which are then further broken down into "divisions" which normally
consist of three or more members. However, when a division is short
handed, a decision may bear the signature of only one division member
plus the chairman of the panel involved (although it is also examined by
the other panel chairmen who have the option to require a full Board
decision). See George E. Martin & Co., ASBCA 3117 (Oct. 19, 1956);
Maryland Wiping Cloth Co., ASBCA 3245 (July 3, 1956). (Note that the
numbering of the appeal does not reflect the date of issuance).
7a It is gratifying to note the appearance of the new Commerce Clearing
House Reports of ASBCA and other cases dating from July 1, 1956. The
preceeding two years, however, remain largely inaccessible.
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i TERVIINATION FOR DEFAULT / TERIINATION
FOR CONVENIENCE
There is one other preliminary matter which we feel
is worthy of brief comment. We have pointed out that sup-
ply contracts provide that they may be terminated for the
default of the contractor and for the convenience of the
Government. In the latter case, a settlement reached by
negotiation is to be regarded as final and binding on the
parties.' And, although the contract does not spell this
out, no reason is perceived why the Government may not
cancel a contract without reference to either provision
and enter into a supplemental agreement settling the rights
of the parties.' Is a choice among these alternatives avail-
able to the government contracting officer in the case of a
delinquent contractor?
It is not immediately apparent from the contract
whether the contracting officer may elect to terminate a
contract for the convenience of the Government under the
clause so entitled (or whether he may elect to cancel
it without reliance on such provision) in the event that
the contractor is, for one of the reasons specified in sub-
clause "(a)" of the "default" clause, in delinquency.
Certainly the contract does not provide that the contract-
8 United States v. Corliss Steam-Engine Co., 91 U.S. 321 (1875). Cf.
18 Comp. Gen. 826 (1939) and 29 Comp. Gen. 36 (1949), in which the
Comptroller General admitted the right to terminate and enter into settle-
ment agreements but did not expressly concede the finality of such agree-
ments. A settlement by determination (an ex parte determination of the
contracting officer which he is to make when the parties fail to negotiate
a settlement) is subject to appeal under the "disputes" clause (ASPR
7-103.12) of the contract and may be revised or set aside on such appeal.
Whether an unappealed contracting officer's decision or an appellate de-
cision is final is to be determined in the light of the provisions of the
"Disputes Act", 68 STAT. 81 (1954), 41 U.S.C. §§ 321-22 (Supp. 1955).
9 Ohio Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Willys Corp., 16 F2d 859 (3d Cir,
1926). In 18 Comp. Gen. 826 and 29 Comp. Gen. 36, supra note 8, the power
of officers of the executive agencies to terminate and settle contracts for
the convenience of the Government was recognized as existing even in
the absence of authorizing contract provisions. See 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §
1236 (1951).
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ing officer must terminate under the "default" clause in
such a case. In the case of some delinquent contractors, the
termination of their contracts under the "convenience"
clause (or cancellation without reliance on that clause)
must be appealing to the contracting officer, as, for ex-
ample, where it is desired to retain the contractor in the
mobilization base. Because a termination for convenience
or cancellation may result in a "no-cost" settlement, ° the
advantage of this procedure is apparent. The usefulness
of settlement in this fashion is also apparent in a case
where the Government does not desire to repurchase the
items called for in a contract with a delinquent contractor
and where the actual loss to the Government is insub-
stantial. Nonetheless, there seems to be a dearth of authori-
ty on whether cancellation or termination and settlement
is permissible in such circumstances despite the apparent
"convenience" to the Government of thus simply writing
the contract off its books. 1 Partly, the question is one of
the authority of any officer of the executive agencies to
10 That is, mutual releases by the parties without any duty of money
payment being assumed by the Government. See ASPR 8-519.5. (Jan. 3
1955), CCH Gov'T CONTRACTS REP., fr 48,819.5. It is believed that such a
settlement could legitimately extinguish claims by the Government against
the contractor by means of set-off against amounts owed to the contractor.
It should be noted, however, that ASPR 8-519.5 appears to militate against
such settlement: "If no costs have been incurred by the Contractor in
respect of the terminated portion of the contract, or if the Contractor is
willing to waive the costs incurred by it, and no amounts are due to the
Government under the contract, a no-cost SEttlement Agreement . . .
shall be executed by the Contractor and the Contracting Officer."
11 There are many decisions (which do not deal, however, with the pre-
cise issue raised in the text) holding or noting that officers of the Govern-
ment may not "give away," "surrender" or "waive" vested rights of the
Government without either statutory authority or without consideration
to the Government. Some of these decisions are noted in the next footnote.
On the other hand, the Court of Claims in Lang Co. v. United States, 141
F. Supp. 943 (1956), seemed to take the view that the Government and a
delinquent contractor might by mutual agreement cancel their contract
even though the Government incurred excess costs in repurchasing the
contract items elsewhere. In such case the Government could not charge
the contractor with such excess costs by setting off its claim against amounts
due the contractor under other contracts. No notice in writing of termination
under the default provisions of the contract was ever given.
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release "vested" rights;' 2 partly, it is a question of the
authority of contracting officers, under administrative
rules or policies governing their conduct, to exercise the
right conferred upon them by the contract to terminate
for convenience.' 3 It is beyond the scope of this article
to attempt a definitive answer to an internal problem of
Government except to indicate that it is not altogether
clear why the right of the Government to performance
12 In Ms. Comp. Gen. B-128316, July 13, 1956, 36 Comp. Gen. 27, .he
contractor had bid on a contract for supplies and its low bid contained an
apparent error. The contracting officer twice requested that the bid be
verified and twice was answered that it was correct. Award was made.
One month later, the contractor discovered that there was, in fact, an
error and requested "cancellation". The Comptroller General held that
the cancellation request could not be granted, indicating that the reason
for this was the absence of authority in any government officer, without
statute, to give away or surrender the vested right of the Government.
The decisions relied upon were: Day v. United States, 245 U.S. 159 (1917)
(contractor not entitled to extra compensation when performance became
more expensive or burdensome than anticipated); Simpson v. United States,
172 U.S. 372 (1899) (extra compensation denied where unforeseen circum-
stances added to expense of performance); Chouteau v. United States, 95
U.S. 61 (1877) (delay incident to change order increased cost of work not
changed and no judgment could be granted for these costs); American
Sales Corp. v. United States, 32 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 280
U.S. 574 (1929) (government officer did not have authority to supersede
surplus sales contract by a second "contract" merely reducing the price
of the items sold); Bausch & Lomb Optical Co. v. United States, 78 Ct. C1.
584 (1934) (contract for services previously rendered held unenforceable);
Pacific Hardware & Steel Co. v. United States, 49 Ct. Cl. 327 (1914) (dicta
on waiver or release of accrued liquidated damages) (also, see earlier opin-
ion in the same case, 48 Ct. Cl. 399 (1913); 22 Comp. Gen. 260 (1942) (re-
duction of rent on property leased by the Government to parking lot
operator unauthorized when lessee's income from premises was reduced
due to World War II gas rationing). See also Ms. Comp. Gen. B-129249,
October 11, 1956 (no authority to waive excess costs where they had
already been established under a repurchase contract which was fully
performed). The most that can be drawn from these cases seems to be
that the Government can insist on performance of its contracts and that
no government officer is authorized to reduce or increase prices without
consideration, or waive accrued liquidated damages or excess costs. They
do not really solve the question of whether a government contracting
officer can elect to cancel a contract or terminate pursuant to the "con-
venience" clause and enter into a settlement agreement embodying mutual
releases.
13 In general, officers of the Government have only such authority as is
derived ultimately from the Constitution and laws of the United States,
administrative regulations and from delegation of authority from superior
officers. One of the recurring themes is that the United States is never
Continued on page 198
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of its contracts according to their terms should not be
regarded as a vested right, subject, at least, to divestiture
pursuant to the "convenience" clause.
II
REDUCING THE CONTRACTOR'S RISK:
EXCUSABLE DELAYS
Paragraph (b) of the standard "default" article sets
out those causes of failure to perform which will im-
munize the contractor from liability for excess costs if
the Government repurchases, and which will transform
a default termination into one for convenience of the
Government.
(b) The Contractor shall not be liable for any excess
costs if any failure to perform the contract arises out of
estopped to deny the invalidity or unauthorized character of the acts
of its officers or agents. But see George H. Whike Constr. Co. v. United
States, 140 F. Supp. 560 (1956). Delegations of authority to a government
contracting officer can be effective restrictions on the authority of contract-
ing officers to act; naturally, the delegation itself must be sufficient to en-
compass the contractual act before the latter can bind the Government.
See Gordon Woodrooffe Corp. v. United States, 104 F. Supp. 984, cert. denied,
344 U.S. 908 (1952), in which the existence of authority was sought to be
found in a telephone conversation between two officers of the Government.
Consequently, the authority of a contracting officer to bind the Govern-
ment by an election to terminate a delinquent contractor for the convenience
of the Government may well be restricted by administrative limitations
on his authority to do so. For example, the Department of the Navy pub-
lished a directive on the subject, stating Navy policy with respect thereto.
This directive (NCPD 54-56, as revised Feb. 17, 1956) was incorporated in
Navy Procurement Directives par. 8-001.
It should be noted that general authority to settle and adjust claims for
and .against the United States is given to the General Accounting Office
pursuant to 42 STAT. 24 (1921), 31 U.S.C. § 71 (1952). To the extent that the
Government has a claim against a delinquent contractor (and it would
appear to have some right to actual damages for any breach), such claim
is subject to the settlement powers of the GAO. Of course, it may also be
settled in the courts in an action by the United States or on a counterclaim
by the United States in an action, if any, brought by the contractor. See 62
STAT. 933 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2) (Z) (1950), 62 STAT. 940 (1948), as
amended, 68 STAT. 1241 (1954), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1491 (1955 Supp.). On the
functions of the General Accounting Office with respect to Government
contracts, see Birnbaum, Government Contracts: The Role of the Comptrol-
ler General, 42 A.B.A.J. 433 (1956).
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causes beyond the control and without the fault or negli-
gence of the Contractor. Such causes include, but are
not restricted to, acts of God or of the public enemy,
acts of the Government, fires, floods, epidemics, quaran-
tine restrictions, strikes, freight embargoes, unusually
severe weather, and defaults of subcontractors due to
any of such causes unless the Contracting Office shall
determine that the supplies or services to be furnished
by the subcontractor were obtainable from other sources
in sufficient time to permit the Contractor to meet the
required delivery schedule 14
Any cause is sufficient to excuse, then, which is "beyond
the control and without the fault or negligence of the con-
tractor."
An immediate problem, but one which has been authori-
tatively settled, is whether those causes of delay specifical-
ly mentioned are excuses in any and all circumstances, or
whether they must conform to the general test. This
question arose in United States v. Brooks-Callaway Co.,'5
which involved a "default" article in a construction con-
tract similar to the present article in supply contracts with
the added requirement for excuse that the cause of failure
be "unforeseeable." The contractor was delayed 278 days
by floods. The contracting officer assessed liquidated dam-
ages for the 183 days of this delay which he held to be
due to conditions of-flood that normally occurred each
year. The other 95 days of delay were considered to be
unforeseeable and, therefore, excusable. His decision was
upheld by the Supreme Court which stated that the
general test conditioned the excusability of the named
causes and that, if the delay were either foreseeable or
within the contractor's control, or if it resulted from his
fault or negligence, it was not excusable irrespective of
its source.
There is no specific requirement of unforeseeability of
delay in the current standard "default" article used in
14 See Appendix A infra.
15 318 U.S. 120 (1943).
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defense supply contracts. However, in effect, the tests are
identical, for, if the contractor is late in delivering due to
delays which, although beyond his control, are foreseeable,
the delinquency is considered to arise from his own "fault
or negligence." If the delays were foreseeable, they should
have been provided for when the contractor made his
delivery commitments, and failure to so provide is negli-
gence.Y
Barring specific provision to the contrary, it seems safe
to say that no foreseeable cause will operate as an excuse.
The converse, however, is not necessarily true. Causes
which are essentially unforeseeable, such as negligence
on the part of the contractor, of course are ineffective to
excuse delay. Probably the whole formula could be re-
duced to the unitary notion of "fault," and the Board
sometimes goes no further than this in articulating the
excusability of delay.
Before examining the excusability of various specific
causes for delay, there is another general problem that
deserves attention. Assuming that excusable cause does
exist, is a contractor relieved of liability if the supplies
he was to furnish are procurable in the open market or
can be obtained from an available subcontractor? For
instance, if a strike delays him in manufacturing the items
himself, must a contractor turn to a subcontractor for
assistance where this is possible? Such a duty to purchase
elsewhere if possible is specifically defined in the "default"
article in those cases where the delay arises from the
"defaults of subcontractors." Whether the express in-
clusion of the duty in that situation operates to exclude
it in all others seems seldom to have been discussed by
the Board. The matter might be decided simply by ref-
erence to the general test of excusability which condi-
tions all causes. Thus the mere fact that the contractor is
himself incapacitated by a fire or strike would not be con-
36 See e.g., A. M. Loveman Lumber & Box Co., ASBCA 3029 (March 26,
1956). But cf. 35 Comp. Gen. 460 (1956).
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clusive of the question whether failure to deliver was
"beyond his control and without his fault and negligence"
if it is shown that supplies were available elsewhere. At
least one opinion of the Board seems to have reached this
conclusion in holding a fire to be no excuse since the
lumber called for was readily available elsewhere." In
another opinion there is dictum that ". . . seldom would a
delay be beyond the control of a contractor, if the sup-
plies were procurable on the open market."'" The Comp-
troller General has taken a definite stand on the problem
in a number of instances, stating that, ".... where supplies
are readily procurable from other sources, . . . causes
which otherwise might . . . excuse performance . . . will
not excuse .... "" Such a stand rigorously enforced would
emasculate the concept of excusable cause. Every man-
ufacturer involved in unavoidable delays from an epi-
demic or even from acts of the Government would be
forced to waste his work in process and engage a sub-
contractor to complete the job. Every strike bound con-
tractor would await the end of the strike at his own peril,
if he failed to seek a substitute supplier. On the other hand,
it seems unfair to the Government to excuse a contractor
for a fire which destroyed his production facilities when
there are other producers in the area from whom he
could easily purchase the contract requirements. The
present language of the "default" article is insufficient to
distinguish these cases. The question almost never seems
to be raised before the Board except when a subcon-
tractor's failure is involved.
i THE DELAYS OF SUBCONTRACTORS
Having discussed excusability in general, an examina-
tion should be made of a few of the most important and
controversial specific causes of delay. The delays of sub-
17 J. F. Weaver Lbr. Co., ASBCA 1448-50 (Aug. 24, 1953).
18 Andresen & Co., ASBCA 633 (Dec. 13, 1950).
19 27 Comp. Gen. 621 (1948), at 624.
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contractors have been by far the most troublesome of the
various excuses. In the first place, the language of the
"default" article leaves it doubtful whether the delays of
the subcontractor would have to be excusable in order
to excuse the prime contractor. This was for some time
the interpretation favored by several members of the
Board. In Elite Specialty Metal Co.,2 it was held that, since
the breakdown of machinery in his own plant would not
have excused the prime, the same cause in the subcon-
tractor's plant would not do so. This decision and others
like it represented, over and above a mere contract in-
terpretation, a fear that the opposite result would pro-
mote collusion. The prime contractor who wished to jet-
tison a losing contract could well make a clandestine ar-
rangement with the subcontractor whose deliberate non-
performance would insulate the prime from liability.
This fear was belittled by opposing Board members, and
they insisted that whether the delays were excusable to
the subcontractor or not, if the contractor himself were
faultless, the article required that he be excused. This in-
terpretation seems to have prevailed since the decision
of the full Board (several members dissenting) in Andre-
sen & Co. 21 in 1950. There it was held specifically that,
if the prime contractor were without fault, this would be
sufficient in any case to excuse him.
The Andresen approach by no means assures the prime
contracjor that his supplier's delays will excuse him. The
20 ASBCA 419 (March 29, 1950). See also Krauss v. Greenbarg, 137 F.2d
569 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 791 (1943). The Interior Department
Board of Contract Appeals seems to adhere to this interpretation. See
Schmidt Steel Co., IBCA 29 (Nov. 10, 1955).
21 Andresen & Co., ASBCA 633 (Dec. 13, 1950). This does not seem to
be the rule, however, in the case of contracts to supply the Government
with articles which were once war surplus. The risk of acquisition seems
to be on the contractor in all such cases and no failure of a supplier will
excuse. Projects Unlimited, ASBCA 2563 (Nov. 30, 1955). The Defense
Department is currently considering the inclusion of a provision in the
"default" article specifically requiring that the subcontractor's delays be
excusable.
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contractor himself may still be at fault in at least four
ways. First, he may be held responsible for delays on the
basis of negligent selection of a supplier. This was pointed
out in the AndTesen opinion which stressed the importance
of the prudent selection, in that case, of a supplier with an
excellent prior performance record.22 Secondly, the con-
tractor must have some reasonable assurance of the
availability of supplies prior to entering the contract, al-
though just what constitutes such assurance is not clear.23
Third, it is clear that the contractor must exercise diligence
after the contract is entered by using reasonable pressure
to require performance of his subcontractor.' Fourth, as
already noted, the contractor is under a specific duty to
find an alternate supplier if possible when the original
subcontractor fails. Whether the contractor must buy
elsewhere regardless of price is a practical problem which
the Board has left in doubt. In several cases it has sug-
gested that an increase in cost is nothing more than a
business risk,2 but in the more recent decision in Harvey-
Whipple the door has been left open to possible excuse
where there is ".... concrete proof that the cost.., would
have been fantastically out of proportion ....,,
22 Ibid. See also Adrena Giragosian, ASBCA 567, March 20, 1951). No
case was found in which excuse was actually denied on the basis of the
supplier's general reputation. However, where the contractor knew that his
supplier previously had experienced trouble with the specification involved,
the delays were not excusable. Merion Worsted Mills, ASBCA 784 (Dec. 11,
1951). Cf. Frank L. Weiss, ASBCA 2786 (Oct. 24, 1955).
23 The solidity of the commitment required probably varies directly
with the degree of difficulty that can be foreseen in procuring the material.
In United Surgical Supplies Co., ASBCA 1328 (June 23, 1953), prior com-
mitments were held unnecessary where the contractor had reasonable as-
surances and "In view of the limited and closely integrated nature of the
industry .. ." See also Federal Fawick Corp., ASBCA 2468 (Oct. 25, 1955);
Metalcraft Engineering Corp, ASBCA 2276 (Sept. 22, 1955).
24 No decision has been found turning upon this question alone. The
problem tends to blend with that of the efforts made by the contractor to
find an alternate supplier. See Newark Weaving Mills, ASBCA 3026 (July
17,1956).
25 Johnson Automatic Arms, Inc., ASBCA 758 (Jan. 26, 1951); River-
side Screw Products, ASBCA 354 (May 29, 1950).
26 ASBCA 2045 (Sept. 30, 1954).
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The tenor of liberality in the Board's decisions has been
somewhat unsettled by a 1953 decision of the Court of
Claims, which has apparently accepted the Andresen
interpretation but has set a rigid standard of prognostica-
tion for the prime contractor in selecting his suppliers. In
Poloron Products Inc. v. United States," the failure of a
subcontractor who was fabricating dies for newly de-
signed canteens was held inexcusable to the prime con-
tractor on the theory that, since the manufacturing process
was a new one, delays were forseeable. Although the test
of foreseeability remains extant under this view, the con-
tractor may have no basis on which to foretell, at least
if he is required to be more prescient where the article
previously has never been made than where it is a stand-
ard product. It is precisely when the specifications and
design are new that it is most difficult to foresee the
problems of manufacture. Foresight is frequently im-
possible in a new article when the contractor is man-
ufacturing it himself. Where he is subcontracting, the
difficulty is compounded. It seems unfair to tax the
contractor with delays, the foreknowledge of which would
be sheer clairvoyance. The test of foreseeability should
be the same whether the item is new or standard and
should apply to probable events and not merely to vague
premonitions.
The Board appears restive under the Poloron approach
and anxious to distinguish wherever possible. In the re-
cent appeal of Harwood Mfg. Co.," a full Board (with
three dissents) distinguished the Poloron case without
reference to the novelty of the specifications involved and
held that, where the defaulting subcontractor is a sole
supplier of a necessary metal, the Government has in effect
chosen the supplier, and the prime contractor cannot be
held for resulting delays. The opinion is far from clear,
27 126 Ct. C1. 816, 116 F. Supp. 588 (1953).
28 ASBCA 1831 (Nov. 23, 1955).
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but it gives an impression of the distress of the majority
of the Board over the strictures of Poloron. On the other
hand, in the later opinion in Newark Weaving Mills,29
signed by three members of the Board, two of them dis-
senters in Harwood, the failure of a supplier was held
inexcusable although (1) the original subcontractor broke
a firm commitment, later settling a resulting suit; (2) the
contractor endeavored without success to get other sup-
pliers to do the work; (3) there was no evidence either that
the original subcontractor was poorly chosen or that
the contract items were anything but standard. The Board
suggested the importance of the fact that the unwillingness
of the alternate suppliers was the result of the contractor's
financial condition. One is inclined to wonder whether such
circumstance is either foreseeable to or the fault of a
contractor who has a prior firm commitment from a
normally responsible supplier. 'The predictability of re-
sults in this area leaves a good deal to be desired.
ii ACTS OF THE GOVERNMENT
When the Government interferes with or hinders the
contractor, the resulting delays may have several effects:
they may (1) give rise to an action for damages, (2) re-
quire an equitable adjustment of the contract price ac-
cording to its terms, (3) render the delays excusable to
the contractor. This discussion will treat principally of the
excusability of such delays. The problem of damages for
the delay of the Government is an old one which still seems
to provide a tilting ground for the Supreme Court and
the Court of Claims. The latter continually asserts that
unreasonable delays caused by the Government constitute
a breach, while, to all appearances, the high Court still
insists that such acts merely require extensions in the
29 ASBCA 3026 (July 17, 1956).
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delivery schedule."° The Defense Department has acted
to effect contractually the conclusion of the Court of
Claims by providing in the standard forms for equitable ad-
justments in price for certain delays of the Government,
notably late delivery of government furnished property.
These problems of damages and price adjustments for the
Government's delay must be distinguished from the issue
of excusability of the contractor's own delay caused by
acts of the Government. The issue of excusability arises
only after a termination for default or an assessment of
liquidated damages-that is, as a defense to a claim of the
Government. The defense, if proved, will entitle the con-
tractor to positive relief under the contract itself through
a termination for convenience granted administratively
rather than through an action for damages before a court
or through an adjustment in price.
The test of excusability for acts of the Government is
no different from the general test of fault on the part
of the contractor. It is uncomplicated by the casuistries of
the damage cases where distinctions sometimes are made
between acts of the Government done in its "contractual"
as opposed to its "sovereign" capacity."' In the termination
appeals, if the delay is unavoidable and unforeseeable by
the contractor, it does not matter whether it was caused by
an Act of Congress or the sheer perversity of the con-
tracting officer. For example, where a contractor in a
foreign country was prevented by American embassy
officials from performing acts necessary to procure food
30 A series of reversals by the Supreme Court seems to have terminated
with United States v. Foley Co, 329 U.S. 64 (1946). Since that time the
Court of Claims has twice assessed damages against the Government for
delay. Ozark Dam Constructors v. United States, 130 Ct. Cl. 354, 127 F. Supp.
187 (1955); Geo. A. Fuller Co. v. United States, 108 Ct. Cl. 70, 69 F. Supp.
409 (1947). See generally, Anderson, Damages for Delays in the Law of Gov-
ernment Contracts, 21 So. CALiF. L. REv. 125 (1948); Seltzer and Gross,
Federal Government Construction Contracts: Liability for Delays Caused
by the Government, 25 FOaPDRAM L. REV. 423 (1956).
31 Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934); Horowitz v. United
States, 267 U.S. 458 (1925).
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under an Army contract, the consequent delinquency was
excusable and the default termination improper. 2 Had
the contractor been seeking relief in a court, it is not
clear that such interference, being in a "sovereign" ca-
pacity, would have supported an action for damages.
Among the acts of the Government occasionally said
to excuse delay are some specifically permitted by the
contract forms. Exactly speaking, these acts do not ex-
cuse delay, but rather go beyond mere excuse and extend
the delivery dates. Such acts, for instance, as changes in
specifications and late or defective deliveries of govern-
ment furnished property, entitle the contractor to com-
pensating extensions of time. These are mentioned because
the Board occasionally overlooks the distinction between
excuse and extension of the schedule and uses acts such
as change orders as the basis for "excusing" contractors'
delays." The importance of recognizing the distinction
will be discussed further in the section on extension of the
delivery schedule.
Acts which would constitute breaches of contract by
the Government also frequently operate to excuse. An
obvious case is a termination for default issued before
any deliveries are overdue.34 Another is the refusal to
make partial payments where they are provided for in
the contract." The payment clause involved usually states
that partial payments are in the discretion of the con-
tracting officer, but, where such payments have been
bargained for and consideration given, the Government
clearly has no right to withhold them without excuse.
32 Mertz Merchandise Agency, ASBCA 608 (Aug. 24, 1950).
33 See, e.g., Halstead & Mitchell, ASBCA 2424 (Jan. 30, 1956).
34 Chevy Chase Pet Shop, ASBCA 2151 (July 28, 1954). Actually such
cases do not involve an excuse problem at all. Since the contractor is not
in delinquency, there is nothing to excuse. This seems true also where the
delivery schedule has been waived.
35 United States v. Lennox Metal Mfg. Co, 131 F. 2d. 717 (2d Cir. 1955);
Geo. E. Martin & Co., ASBCA 3117 (Oct. 19, 1956); Valley Forge & Car
,Co, ASBCA 2394-95 (May 9, 1956); Halstead & Mitchell, supra note 33.
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Further, the contractor also may be excused by failure
of the Government to reasonably perform acts of as-
sistance to the contractor which are, strictly speaking, not
even required. The Government generally makes no
promise to inspect completed items of manufacture. How-
ever, where an inspector was customarily present in the
plant, his withdrawal and refusal to inspect because of
erroneous reports of defects from the receiving installa-
tion was justification for the contractor's ceasing pro-
duction." In another appeal, Presto Beverage Corp.,3' 7 the
Government took samples for testing long before delivery
date. It delayed informing the contractor of unsatisfactory
test results until after delivery date, at which time it
terminated for default. The delay obviously prejudiced.
the contractor's opportunity to correct the defects before
delivery date, and his failure to do so was held excusable.
Generally speaking, however, the contractor cannot hold
up production while awaiting the results of tests by the
Government unless the delay in testing becomes "un-
reasonable."3 Isolated Board opinions have suggested that,
since there is no duty whatsoever on the Government to
inform the contractor of the outcome of tests, resulting
delay is never excusable.39
Other governmental acts of assistance, which were bun-
gled or refused have not excused the contractor. A delay in
supplying unrequired drawings," an erroneous statement
of opinion as to the availablity of suppliers,4" a refusal
of government inspectors to give advice on specifications,'
36 Northwestern Corp., ASBCA 2025 (Feb. 15, 1956). See also Stafford
v. United States, 109 Ct. Cl. 479, 74 F. Supp. 155 (1947).
37 ASBCA 1510 (April 13, 1954).
38 Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., ASBCA 1061 (March 21, 1955), where the
refusal of government inspectors to cross picket lines at appellant's plant
was excusable cause for delay. See also Schwartz Mattress Co., ASBCA 403.
(April 26, 1950); Champion Pants Mfg. Co., ASBCA 312 (Jan. 30, 1950).
39 Bo-Jack Mfg. Corp., ASBCA 280 (July 27, 1950).
40 Keco Industries, ASBCA 2755 (April 18, 1955).
41 Newark Weaving Mills, ASBCA 3026 (July 17, 1956).
42 Jensen Dental Instrument Co., ASBCA 1451 (June 23, 1953).
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and an approval of the wrong production method43 have
all been held not to excuse on the ground that, since there
is no duty in the first place to perform these services, the
contractor has no right to depend upon them. He may,
however, depend on the Government to promptly clarify
specifications once an ambiguity is brought to its at-
tention, for the Government is bound to supply specifica-
tions possible of clear interpretation.'
A last problem is the treatment of concurrent delays
of contractor and Government. Generally, if it is found
that the delays cannot be segregated, the Board, without
explanation, holds for the contractor.45 This approach is
not inevitable, as is apparent from the recent decision in
Grosse Pointe Accessory Corp.,46 where the Board held
for the Government despite a finding that the delays could
not be segregated. However, in that case the delays by
the Government were not significant when compared with
the total delay involved, and the integrity of the general
rule seems to be unaffected.
iii LACK OF KNOW-HOW
Where the contractor has difficulty with the actual
manufacture of a contract item, the decisions offer him
no basis for optimism. As early as 1915 the Supreme Court
held that only where an article is impossible of manufac-
ture is a contractor excused even though the contract
grants absolution for "unavoidable causes." This arose
in Carnegie Steel Co. v. United States4 7 where the con-
tractor undertook to make armor plate to new specifica-
tions and was delayed by the necessity, unforeseen by
either party, of developing an entirely new technique of
manufacture. In holding for the Government, the Court
considered and specifically rejected the application of the
43 Michigan Metal Products Co., ASBCA 2884 (April 2, 1956).
44 Dearborn Gage Co, ASBCA 2785 (August 12, 1955).
45 Sid's Truck & Auto Sales Inc., ASBCA 2041, 2093 (Dec. 15, 1955).
46 ASBCA 2656 (Dec. 30, 1955).
47 240 U.S. 156 (1916).
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"unavoidable causes" provision.
What was said earlier about the harshness of requiring
foreknowledge in choosing a subcontractor is equally rel-
evant here."' Only by an unwarranted stretch of imagina-
tion can any fault be found on the part of the contractor
in such cases. Clearly it is not the intention of the "de-
fault" article to punish a contractor whose delays result
not from his own negligence but from the limitations of
the manufacturing art at the time he undertakes the
contract. This is not a -commercial undertaking by the
Government; it may well be a scientific undertaking, how-
ever, if the specifications are new. Under such circum-
stances the experience and struggles of a competent con-
tractor are of great benefit to the Government in determin-
ing methods and feasibility of manufacture. When the de-
sign is new,, greater rather than less leeway should be
allowed.
The problem created by the Carnegie Steel decision has
been minimized by the advent of research and develop-
ment contracts under which the contractor is generally
not obliged to complete a specific product.49 Most of the
contracts resulting in appeals to the Board involve the
manufacture of an item previously made, and short shrift
is given the contractor who is unsuccessful in meeting
specifications. Some few appeals, however, do involve
newly designed items, and more deal with change orders
which often have radically altered specifications during
the time of performance. At least in the change order
situation the Board has relaxed the requirement of "know-
how." Although the "changes" article requires the con-
tractor to perform any change "within the general scope"
of the contract, lack of "know-how" is excusable wherever
48 Note that Poloron Products Inc. v. United States, supra note 27 cites
the Carnegie Steel Co. case as authority.
49 No doubt, the use of cost reimbursement contracts has also materially
reduced the contractor's risk of loss in case of failure to complete the work
successfully.
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"6... a much higher degree of technical skill and ability
than normally was to have been expected.. ." is required
by a change in specifications.5' This result seems entirely
proper. Assuming even that the Carnegie Steel standard
is correct, there is no reason to infer the same guarantees
of performance with regard to change orders by a con-
tractor who has no way of anticipating the alterations in
design.
There is evidence in a 1955 decision of the Board that
the lack of productive ability may sometimes be excused
even where no change orders are issued. In Federal-
Fawick Corp.,5 the appellant's own production dies were
warped and useless, thereby delaying the work. The
inability to use the dies was held excusable. This result
seems at odds with most of the decisions which require
the contractor to have and maintain adequate equipment52
and skilled laborers53 to perform the work involved.
It may be relevant here to note the standard of manu-
facturing performance demanded of a contractor. Scores
of ASBCA decisions have required a literal conformance
with specifications, including cases where items were re-
peatedly rejected for insignificant deviations, different
reasons being given for rejection each time the former
deviations were corrected. Recent decisions, however,
augur the acceptance of some form of the doctrine of sub-
stantial performance. Quite recently, in Acme Litho Plate
50 The Stubnitz-Green Spring Corp, ASBCA 2608, 3651 (Aug. 9,
1956). Here the performance requirements of a burster casing were radically
increased. Although perhaps possible of accomplishment, the necessary
expertise was not available to the contractor. At some point, obviously, the
change order exceeds "the general scope" of the contract and becomes a
breach by the Government.
5- ASBCA 2468 (Oct. 25, 1955).
52 The Northwestern Corp., supra note 36; Welded Construction Engi-
neering Co., ASBCA 618 (Dec. 6, 1950).
53 Bruce Tool & Die Shop, ASBCA 3070 (June 28, 1956). Even a general
labor shortage caused by competition in the area will not excuse. Grosse
Pointe Accessory Corp., supra note 46; Stephens Garment Co., ASBCA 237
(April 24, 1952). But cf. Lewis Construction Co, ASBCA 216 (May 31, 1950).
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Graining, Inc.,"4 the Board held ". . . the plates did not
meet specifications .... Whether or not there was sub-
stantial compliance we believe to be an issue properly
before us ... ." No such compliance was found because the
contractor had failed to come within liberal tolerances al-
ready allowed in the specifications. The Board noted that
its decision might have been different had the specifications
been without tolerances. This is certainly a satisfactory
result. The complex minutiae of Government specifications
often rule out the practical possibility of literal com-
pliance. Unless an eqpitable escape hatch is provided, the
contractor is at the mercy of that rare but real contracting
officer seeking a basis for termination among minuscule
defects. There is nothing in the standard forms to impede
the use of the doctrine of substantial performance."5 The
inspection article permits rejection for lack of ". . . con-
formity with the requirements of this contract . . .," but
this merely begs the question. Absent any further pro-
vision, the Board seems justified in looking to the purpose
of the goods to be delivered and other indirect evidence
to determine the extent of the contractor's undertaking.
Nit-picking by inspectors may be contemplated in a
contract for guided missiles, but it hardly seems apropos
in a sale of snare drums. "
54 ASBCA 2878-79 (Oct. 12, 1956). The writers' memories insist this is
not the Board's first flirtation with substantial performance. It is, no doubt,
indecorous to cite memory as authority, but this will have to suffice until
the Board sees fit to publish another digest.
We may note here also the special situation of an accumulation of minor
defects under a service contract to be performed to the "satisfaction of the
contracting officer." In that circumstance the Board suggests that a defect
of performance, in itself minor, may yet act as the last straw to create a
legitimate "dissatisfaction" and justify termination. Ideal Vans, ASBCA
2724 (Dec. 31, 1955).
55 Except, possibly, where the termination is effected under Subsection
a (ii) of the "default" article. See discussion infra, p. 214.
56 Slingerland Drum Co., ASBCA 2131 (Jan. 5, 1955), is the classic ex-
ample. The Navy rejected repeatedly the drums for inconsequential defects
and on each rejection named different defects. The Board upheld the
termination for default.
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iv MISCELLANEOUS CAUSES
Delays occur from a great variety of causes in addition
to those noted. Those resulting from fires, floods, bad
weather, and similar physical interferences cause little
doctrinal difficulty and merely require an assessment of
their duration, unless there is fault involved in some
way. Strikes generally seem to excuse, except perhaps
where an unfair labor practice by the employer may be
involved." Financial inadequacy is more complex, but,
where it has been held excusable, it is usually traceable
to some act of the Government, such as an improper assess-
ment or a withholding of partial payments." Absent such
facts, the contractor guarantees that his financial resources
will be sufficient to complete the work, unless its character
is radically changed. 9
One of the curiosities in the way of excuses for failure
to perform was pleaded in Old Home Milk Company.6"
The contractor, a milk dealer, had agreed to deliver milk
to an Air Force base. Because of this contract the company
was threatened with a ruinous boycott by the local re-
tailers association. The Board held this no excuse since
the contractor had the choice and power of performing
if it wished, and the failure was therefore not beyond
its control.
V W EN THE ISSUE OF EXCUSABILITY MAY BE RAISED
If the contractor appeals a default termination and fails
to prove excusable cause, he is precluded from raising the
same issue in an appeal from a later assessment of excess
57 See Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., ASBCA 1061 (March 21, 1955).
58 See note 35, supra.
59 West Coast Lbr. Corp., ASBCA 1131 (June 29, 1953). See also Michi-
gan Metal Products Co., ASBCA 2884 (April 2, 1956); Adams Mfg. Co.,
ASBCA 2665, 2678 (April 2, 1956).
60 ASBCA 2594, 2666 (Dec. 12, 1955).
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costs. 6 His failure to appeal the termination within the
30 day appeal period does not have the same effect, how-
ever, and he may raise the issue of excusability in an
original appeal from the assessment of excess costs.62
This right is not affected by the fact that the contracting
officer's termination decision contained a specific finding
that the delay was not in fact excusable.' If the appeal,
however, is only from the assessment, the contractor who
proves excusable delay is not entitled to a termination
for convenience but only to relief from excess costs." The
same results would obtain in the case of a termination
followed by an assessment of liquidated damages.
III
TERMINATION FOR FAILURE TO MAKE PROGRESS
AND FOR BREACH OF OTHER PROVISIONS
The great bulk of default terminations are based upon
a present failure of the contractor to meet the delivery
schedule. Where deliveries are overdue, the Government
has clearly reserved the right to terminate for default by
written notice, the issue being raised as to whether the
delays of the contractor were excusable so as to require
a termination for convenience. However, in paragraph
a (ii) of the supply contract "default" article (Appendix A,
infra), the Government also has reserved the same right
to terminate where, though delivery is not yet due, the
61 Aero-Land Supply Co., ASBCA 1869 (May 25, 1954).
62 John Peterson, ASBCA 1633 (March 26, 1954); DeLisser Mfg. Corp,
ASBCA 1002 (1952).
63 ibid.
64 Ibid. When the contractor has failed to employ his contractual rem-
edies, he may not sue in court. United States v. Holpuch, 328 U. S. 234
(1946); Barrett-Cravens Co. v. United States, 137 F. Supp. 423 (Ct. Cl.
1956); Southeastern Oil Florida v. United States, 127 Ct. Cl. 480, 115 F.
Supp. 198 (1953). Query whether he may defend in a Government suit to
collect excess costs or liquidated damages? Is failure to exhaust remedies
a sword as well as a shield for the Government?
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contractor either (1) "so fails to make progress as to
endanger performance" or (2) "fails to perform any of
the other provisions." In these two circumstances the con-
tracting officer may terminate after he has allowed the
contractor a grace period to cure such failure. This period
must be established by a notice in writing' and must allow
at least ten days from its receipt by the contractor.
The "failure to make progress" provision is designed to
permit the Government to discard contractors who are
making no real effort to perform or are hopelessly in-
competent. Under the common law neither situation would
permit unilateral termination before actual default.66
Many procurement officials are inclined to discount the
value of the provision, feeling that a minimum of action
or a sham effort during the usual ten day period set by
the notice will suffice in the Board's eyes to "cure" the
failure to make progress which has endangered per-
formance. The few ASBCA decisions which are relevant
will be discussed shortly, but it should be noted here,
that at least where literally nothing has been done by the
contractor and a default is inevitable, the provision un-
doubtedly gives the Government a right to a default termi-
nation prior to delivery date. This in itself is a significant
expansion of common law remedies.
The decisions suggest a broader interpretation of this
provision, though none seems directly in point. In several
cases the Government, because of a present delinquency,
enjoyed the right to terminate without notice to cure, but
mistakenly issued a notice under subsection a (ii) com-
65 Although the Board has said that notice in writing is indispensable,
Fitzhenry-Guptill, ASBCA 1885 (July 13, 1956), in Bernal Narrow Fabrics,
ASBCA 1604 (Dec. 29, 1953), a course of dealing and negotiations was held
to satisfy the notice requirement.
66 Even where expressed in the contract as justification for termination,
a failure to make reasonable progress may be simply a breach of condition
and not promise. United States v. O'Brien, 220 U.S. 321 (1911). In this case
the Government reserved no right to assess excess costs or damages fol-
lowing such a termination.
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plaining of "failure to make progress" toward the date
already past. Treating such action in effect as a limited
waiver of a present right to terminate, the Board then has
examined the effectiveness of the contractor's efforts dur-
ing the grace period to see if the failure to make reasonable
progress toward a new indeterminate delivery date had
been cured. In Silverman Bros., it was held that the con-
tractor's success during the time allowed in the notice
must be such as ". . . would or should have inescapably
led a reasonable man to the conclusion that appellant had
overcome-or in the next day or two would overcome-its
production difficulties and start delivering." Except for
the last three words, the test also seems applicable where
delivery is not yet due or delinquency has been waived.
In cases where the delivery schedule has been clearly
waived, termination has been upheld under section a(ii)
simply on the finding that the contractor's efforts during
the notice period did not cure the failure to make progress.
Whether the contractor was currently in delinquency was
not necessary to the decision.' In one such case the Board
explicitly refused to consider whether deliveries were
yet due, and held for the Government because the con-
tractor had not cured his failure to make progress within
the time required by the notice given.69 Toward what date
the contractor is obliged to make progress after the
schedule is waived is left in doubt, but these cases do
suggest that the Board will not reject out of hand a de-
fault termination for failure to make progress when the
contractor is not currently in delinquency. After all, this is
the obvious purpose of the provision, and the burden of
proof should be on those who suggest its non-utility. The
paucity of cases on the subject suggest non-use rather than
67 ASBCA 1615, 2186 (May 10, 1955). See also Keco Industries, ASBCA
2755 (April 18, 1956); Michigan Metal Products Co., supra note 59; Metal-
craft Engineering Corp, ASBCA 1906 (Sept. 19, 1955).
68 Michigan Metal Products Co., supra note 59.
69 Bernal Narrow Fabrics, supra note 65.
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uselessness. The appeals that do involve the question sug-
gest consistent misuse. In many of these cases the delays
were obviously excusable,"° or the necessary formalities of
notice were not observed by the Government.' There
seems to be no case in which obviously inadequate or sham
efforts on the contractor's part were held sufficient to cure
a failure to make progress. Properly used, this provision
might prove a potent encouragement to performance.
Whether it is a wise provision would be more difficult to
answer and is not within the scope of this paper.
The dissatisfaction over the provision relating to prog-
ress of the work is directed also to the other clause of sub-
section a (ii) of the "default" article and, perhaps, with
greater reason. This clause permits termination after
notice if the contractor fails to "perform any of the
other provisions" of the contract. Under the common law
an injured party may generally terminate his obligation
without notice in the case of a material breach. As a
result of the provision in question, a serious question exists
whether the Government retains this right except where
explicitly reserved (as for failure to deliver). The Board
has held that the notice provisions of subsection a (ii)
apply to and limit the right of rescission for anticipatory
breach. 2 Apparently the contractor has the opportunity
to withdraw his refusal to perform during the grace
period permitted after receipt of the notice. If the notice
requirement is to be thus extended to material breaches,
the Government obviously has limited its otherwise un-
qualified right to refuse further performance. 3
70 See, e.g., The Northwestern Corp., ASBCA 2025 (Feb. 15, 1956) (re-
fusal to inspect caused excusable delay); Huntington Processing & Pack-
aging, ASBCA 1013, 1032 (Jan. 29, 1954) (government interference caused
delays).
71 Fitzhenry-Guptill Co., supra note 65; The Cowan Co., ASBCA 2373,
2274 (Feb. 28, 1955).
72 The Cowan Co., supra note 71.
73 At least this seems true where the breach involves a provision which
does not itself establish a specific remedy -for instance the "convict labor,"
Continued on page 218
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Since the provision is obviously intended to increase
rather than to limit the Government's common law rights,
wherein can this increase lie? The only answer seems to
be in the types of breach contemplated. Unless some finer
line than materiality can be drawn, the only conclusion
possible is that all breaches, regardless of their importance,
will justify issuance of a notice to cure the defect in per-
formance. If the defect is uncorrected or cannot be cor-
rected within the ten days or more allowed, default termi-
nation may issue. In other words, all breaches are ma-
terial, and contracting officers may harass a contractor
for any of the multitude of trival derelictions which in-
evitably arise under the complexities of the standard
forms. At least at present the problem seems academic,
because termination under this clause is practically never
used. However, if the clause is a useless encumbrance of
the Government's right to rescind for material breach
and yet justifies a termination for trivial breaches where
notice is given, it seems that both parties would be better
off if it were expunged from the forms.
IV
EXTENSION OF THE DELIVERY SCHEDULE
Next we consider the effect of the Government's en-
couraging or permitting attempts at performance where
the contractor is already delinquent without excuse. When
faced with the decision whether or not to terminate, the
financial consequences are not usually the Government's
sole concern. Other considerations may be involved, such
as the contractor's importance to the mobilization base,
"nondiscrimination in employment," and "officials not to benefit," clauses.
Query the effect, however, of subsection a(ii) on the "covenant against
contingent fees" which specifically permits the Government "the right to
annul this contract without liability." Note also that all this is in the face
of the reservation of common law rights in subsection (f) of the "default"
article.
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the extent and nature of the delinquency, the degree to
which the Government may have contributed to the
delay, and concern for the elements of fairness and equity
which may be involved. Ordinarily, when the goods are
still needed, the most important question is whether this
contractor will finish performance prior to any substitute
who may be engaged. If termination will probably delay
deliveries, the Government will permit the contractor to
continue as long as there is a reasonable prospect of per-
formance.
Financial considerations being secondary, the Govern-
ment is considerably more patient with late delivery than
the ordinary buyer. This is reflected in the tremendous
number of appeals which turn on the nature of the Gov-
ernment's action or inaction during the often extended
period between the original failure to deliver and the
eventual termination for default. In these cases the rights
of the parties are frequently shrouded in considerable
doubt. Unless a new delivery schedule has been set by
agreement, it is difficult to determine just when de-
liveries are due and when the Government may terminate
for default. Since the days of the old War Depart-
ment Board of Contract Appeals, such cases have
been dealt with in terms of "waiver" of the delivery
schedule. 4 Where the contractor is in delinquency, any
action by the Government inconsistent with the right to
terminate for default may be regarded by the Board as a
waiver of that right. This includes the issuance of change
orders,7 5 requests for performance,7 6 accepting forecasts
of delivery,7" accepting actual deliveries,7 8 and any other
74 Charles W. Spiedel, WDBCA 894 (Dec. 28, 1944); Modern Engineering
Co., WDBCA 458, 6841 (Jan. 29, 1945). The WDBCA is the direct ancestor
of the present Board.
75 Halstead & Mitchell, ASACA 2424 (Jan. 30, 1956); Indiana Die Cast-
ings, ASBCA 2214 (Aug. 24, 1955).
76 Frank Menard Mfg. Co., ASBCA 1558 (Nov. 10, 1953).
77 Airline Mfg. Co., ASBCA 2213 (Nov. 15, 1955).
78 Roosevelt Paper Co., ASBCA 1861 (Aug. 11, 1954).
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activity which affirms the continued existence of the con-
tract. However, a mere inquiry as to the contractor's ability
to perform will not amount to a waiver, 9 nor will inspec-
tion of finished goods by government personnel, where
such inspection is at the request of the contractor.8 0
Whether silence and inaction will amount to waiver de-
pends upon whether, under the circumstances, a reason-
able man would interpret such silence as an approval of
continued performance.8 ' At some point there is a duty
to speak when the contractor is proceeding, with the
knowledge of the Government, to act in reliance on the
continued withholding of termination action.8 2
It is doubtful whether the use of the waiver approach
has contributed much to the clarification of the problem
or the predictability of the results. The Board has even
experienced difficulty in achieving a uniform approach
among its own members. This does not seem surprising
in view of the chameleon nature of the doctrine and the
variety of its judicial interpretations,' but it does argue
for an attempt at an alternative solution. With a brief
obeisance to the text writers we should note that there
is some doubt whether this is a "waiver" situation in the
first place. Williston concedes the possibility of a sur-
render of rights in accepting late performance but insists
that this is really not waiver but election of remedies-
the choice being the termination of all rights of either party
to the other's further performance or the continuation
79 M. A. Wyman Lbr. Co, ASBCA 145 (June 27, 1950).
80 Metalcraft Engineering Corp.. ASBCA 2276 (Sept. 22, 1955).
83 Sid's Truck & Auto Sales, ASBCA 2041, 2093 (Dec. 15, 1955); Indus-
trial Lamp, ASBCA 1825 (Nov. 23, 1954) (no waiver by mere silence or
inaction in absence of reasonable reliance).
8 Federal Fawick Corp., ASBCA 2468 (Oct. 25, 1955) ("Government can-
not sit back" and watch contractor attempt performance); United Boat
Service Corp., ASBCA 2452 (Oct. 10, 1955).
83 The diffuse character of waiver long has been a source of annoyance
to the legal taxonomists. ". . . There are few principles in the law with
vaguer boundaries.... ." 1 WILLISTON, ComiAcTs § 203 (Rev. ed. 1936); "The
word is . . . A cover for vague, uncertain thought," EWART, WAnVER Dis-
TRmIUTE 5 (1917).
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of all obligations.": He insists that true waiver can
only take place prior to the happening of a condition and
can only be enforced if action is taken in reliance thereon
before revocation of the waiver."8 However, the distinction
between waiver and election is essentially a sterile analysis
and of little assistance in dealing with-the present problem.
Williston, in treating late performance, is content to use
the words interchangeably and even entitles the relevant
section "Delay may be waived."86 Nevertheless, as this
essay goes to press we observe the appearance of an arti-
cle80' by a member of the ASBCA making much of this
distinction. Whether such preoccupation by the Board with
arid nuances is likely to disperse the fog seems doubtful.
What is needed is greater simplicity, not more hairsplitting.
It seems worthwhile to note specifically some of the
difficulties in which the Board is involved. First, there
is no apparent agreement whether notice is required in
order to revive the right to terminate for default after a
waiver. Probably a majority of the tASBCA cases which
turn on waiver require such notice or its equivalent-the
setting of a new delivery schedule.8 7 Does this require-
ment mean there is no obligation on the contractor in the
meantime? This is unlikely, since there seems to be a
requirement of at least some reliance to make the waiver
irrevocable.' 8 The amount of actual performance may be
negligible, however, and even though it is very likely
that the contractor will never deliver, he must be given
84 2 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcTS §§ 678-79, 683 (Rev. ed 1936).
85 Id. § 689.
86 Id. § 856.
68a Cuneo, Waiver of the Due Date in Government Contracts, 43 VA.
L. REv. 1 (1957).
87 Television Equipment Corp., ASBCA 1060 (Aug. 31, 1954). More re-
cently, see Halstead & Mitchell, ASBCA 2424 (Jan. 30, 1956); United Boat
Service Corp., ASBCA 2452 (Oct. 31, 1955); Harvey-Whipple, ASBCA 2045
(Sept. 30, 1954).
88 Acme Litho Plate Graining, Inc., ASBCA 2878-79 (Oct. 12, 1956);
Pacific Welding Alloys Mfg. Co., ASBCA 2718 (Dec. 15, 1955). In both ca-
obvious waivers were overcome by a showing of no attempt at performance
by the contractor.
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notice and a reasonable time thereafter to perform the
contract.89 Generally, the notice requirement seems fair
and in accord with the majority of court opinions,9" es-
pecially where the delay is prolonged and the contractor
is making a sincere effort. It does not mean that the Gov-
ernment cannot take any action to terminate even in the
case of the apathetic contractor or the hopeless incom-
petent. Upon the giving of ten days written notice, section
a(ii) of the "default" article is still available to effect a
termination for "failure to make progress" toward the
new delivery date. It should be observed also that a sub-
stantial minority of Board opinions does not impose the
notice requirement and others have vacillated. Many of
the opinions simply require that the contractor be per-
mitted a reasonable time for performance after the
waiver ."j
With or without the notice requirement, the concept of
reasonable time after waiver is a conundrum. For instance,
how much time is reasonable for a contractor who origi-
nally had a year to deliver and who has done nothing?
If after the waiver he immediately institutes preparations
for delivery, shall he be given a year's time again? He
probably needs it, but is it reasonable? In other words,
should the Board objectively examine only the time the
contractor will need from the day of waiver, or should it
consider what he deserves? Presumably, unless the Gov-
ernment conditions its original waiver, all the past must
be forgiven. If a buyer asks a seller to continue after
89 Steel Products Inc., ASBCA 2605 (Sept. 19, 1955); B. F. Goodrich Co.,
ASBCA 2110 (Nov. 29, 1954).
90 See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 311 (1932); Wi.LisToN, supra note 84 at
§ 856. For a recent decision on this point, see Bradford Novelty Co. v. Tech-
nomatic Ing., 142 Conn. 166, 112 A. 2d 214 (1955). But cf. Shy v. Industrial
Salvage Material Co, 264 Wis. 118, 58 N.W. 2d 452 (1953).
91 Stubnitz-Greene Spring Corp., ASBCA 2469 (June 6, 1956); Federal
Fawick Corp., ASBCA 2468 (Oct. 25, 1955). In J. H. Rutter-Rex & Bay Gar-
ment Corp., ASBCA 2957, 2958 (March 23, 1956), the incongruous con-
clusion is reached that there is a duty on the Government to establish a
new delivery schedule, but that this confers no right on the contractor to
delay beyond a reasonable time if no schedule in fact is set.
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breach of delivery obligations, he cannot then permit
him only half the time he knew the seller would need to
finish. But this seems unsatisfactory if a notice requirement
is superimposed, for the notice will start the time running
once more and will maximize the time allowed the con-
tractor who has made a minimum of effort. It is not
surprising that the Board has shown an inclination to de-
cide the reasonableness of the time allowed by fiat without
niceties of calculation.2 Where notice is required but
not given, there is, of course, no necessity to determine the
reasonableness of the time allowed.13 It should be ob-
served that at least one opinion recognizes the right of
the Government to condition its original waiver to less
than a reasonable time.94
Perhaps the most serious problem of the waiver doctrine
lies in the consistent confusion by the Board of the
three discrete concepts of extension of the delivery sched-
ule, excusability, and waiver. If we accept the waiver
doctrine (or election), an act of the Government incon-
sistent with the delivery schedule'may have one or more of
three effects on that schedule: (1) it may excuse late per-
formance, (2) it may extend the delivery schedule, as does
a change order under the provisions of the "changes"
article, (3) it may constitute a waiver of delay (or elec-
tion). Which effect is produced depends upon whether
the contractor is in delinquency at the time of the incon-
sistent act-that is, whether the Government, at the time,
could terminate for default without liability. An act of
the Government can constitute a waiver or an election not
92 Industrial Precision Products Co., ASBCA 3165 (May 8, 1956); Frank
L. Weiss, ASBCA 2786 (Oct. 24, 1955); Steel Products Inc., ASBCA 2605
(Sept. 29, 1935). Where the contractor suggests a delivery date he may be
held to it as being reasonable. Geo. S. Scott Co., ASBCA 2303-04 (June
26, 1956); Dinges Corp., ASBCA 2067 (July 30, 1954), rev'd 0n other grounds,
(Aug. 17, 1956).
93 Frank Edward Menard, ASBCA 1558 (Nov. 10, 1953). Also see
mote 87 supra.
94 The Northwestern Corp., ASBCA 2025 (Feb. 15, 1956); also see Julio
Laabes, ASBCA 1366 (Feb. 16, 1954).
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to terminate only when it is the first inconsistent act fol-
lowing the contractor's delinquency. If deliveries are not
yet due, have been already waived by a previous act, or
their lateness is excusable, there is no possibility of waiv-
ing, simply because there is nothing to waive. A contractor
is not in delinquency under these circumstances, and a
non-existent delinquency is immune even from the most
generous waiver. An act of the Government at such times
which delays the contractor may excuse the lateness of
future deliveries as we have seen, or a change order may
extend the delivery schedule, but no waiver is possible
except, perhaps, waiver of a future delivery date-a proper
Willistonian waiver." That situation never occurs in
these cases. The Government rarely waives a delivery
schedule in advance, nor indeed is it clear that the con-
tracting officer has the power to do so without con-
sideration.96
Despite the evident impossibility of waiving a non-
existent delinquency, the Board is in the questionable
habit of finding waiver without making any determina-
tion of whether the contractor's delays were already
waived or were excused or whether change orders or
other acts had extended the schedule.9" A contracting
officer who has permitted a contractor to continue be-
cause his delays are excusable may find, when the
excuses run out, that he has "waived" the right to termi-
nate unless he allows a further substantial period of
notice. It seems patently unfair to the Government to
allow the contractor to take advantage of excusability and
95 See supra note 84.
96 See 36 Comp. Gen. 27 (1956). But cf. Lang Co. v. United States, 141 F
Supp. 943 (Ct. Cl. 1956).
97 General Construction Co, ASECA 3131 (June 22, 1956); J. H. Rutter-
Rex & Bay Garment Corp., ASBCA 2957-58 (March 23, 1956); A & P
Wire and Cable Co., ASBCA 2615 (Feb. 10, 1956); Halstead & Mitchell,
ASBCA 2424 (Jan. 30, 1956). In some cases the Board has even coupled
waiver with a specific finding of excusability. See, e.g., Bolinders Co. Inc.,
ASBCA 2457 (Nov. 3, 1955); United Boat Service Corp., ASBCA 2452 (Oct.
31, 1955).
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waiver at the same time. On the other hand, to admit
this would put government attorneys in the bizarre posi-
tion of defending the contractor's excuses prior to the time
of termination in order to forestall the invocation of
waiver.
One final criticism of the waiver approach cannot be
ignored. Under subsection (f) of the "default" article the
Government has made a general reservation of all com-
mon law rights. Appendix A, infra. Presumably this in-
cludes rights to actual damages. There is respectable
authority for the doctrine that an injured party does not
waive his right to damages merely by waiving a delay in
performance and/or electing to continue.9" If the Govern-
ment's action in continuing the contract is interpreted
as the waiver of a default is it not likely that there remains
an action for damages for the delay? The Comptroller Gen-
eral has recently taken this very position and held ex-
plicitly that the acceptance of delayed performance is not
inconsistent with the right to demand damages for delays. 9
The existence of the right to damages is, of course, a
further criticism of those cases finding waiver without
reference to the factor of excusability which determines
that right. It is interesting to ponder the existence of a
contracting officer's duty to withhold actual damages fol-
lowing a decision by the Board finding a waiver of
delinquency.
The problem is equally troublesome when the waiver is
98 See CoRBm, CoNTRACTs § 718 (1951); 2 WnLiSTox, CoNTRACTs §§ 704,
856 (rev. ed. 1936). However, very little in addition to the election to con-
tinue seems necessary to waive damages. Paying full price is admitted by
Williston to do so at least where the payment is made after delivery so that
an assumed requirement of consideration is met. The consideration is said
to be found in the relaxation of the buyer's obligation to pay on the original
delivery date. WILISTON, op. cit. supra, § 704. The contrived quality of this
argument illustrates the tenuousness of the rule against waiving damages
for delay without consideration. It does seem clear, however, that an ex-
press reservation or a refusal to pay full price will preserve the right to
damages even when coupled with an election to accept late performance.
09 35 Comp. Gen. 228 (1955), disapproving a contrary opinion in 29 Comp.
Gen. 57 (1949).
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used to support a remission of liquidated damages which
have accrued before the waiver. In a recent decision of
the Board a contractor had been assessed liquidated dam-
ages from the 22nd of January to the 28th of October, but
the Board found that the schedule had been waived on the
25th of August. The entire assessment was held in error
without any finding as to the excusability of the delays
preceeding the 25th of August.' Even if the decision is
regarded as correct on the law, the question remains as to
the Board's authority to remit accrued damages. Clearly,
no such authority exists.'
In passing, one might also speculate upon the source
of the Board's authority to grant a termination for con-
venience after the schedule is waived. The contract pro-
vides for such relief only where the contractor is in fact
delinquent at the time of termination, and where his
delays prove to be excusable. When, because of a waiver,
or because deliveries are not yet due, the contractor is
not in delinquency, the contract gives no clue as to how an
improper termination for default should be handledloa
Finally, it is impossible to ignore the substantial num-
ber of opinions that abandon the waiver formula alto-
gether, and regard the Government's continuing en-
couragement of a delinquent contractor as a "mere for-
bearance" and not as a bar to termination for default,
even though the contractor has relied thereon."° In
100 General Construction Co., ASBCA 3131 (June 22, 1956). See also
Ampro Corp., ASBCA 1678 (March 1, 1954).
101 The Comptroller General has specific statutory power to remit
liquidated damages when in his discretion it is "just and equitable" to do
so. 62 STAT. 24 (1948), 41 U.S.C. § 155 (1952). This authority has been very
narrowly construed, however. See 32 Comp. Gen. 67 (1952).
lola For an interpretation justifying the granting of a termination for
convenience under these circumstances see Cuneo, supra note 86a.
LO2 Skyway Clothing Corp., ASBCA 3244 (Oct. 29, 1956); Skarda, Inc,
ASBCA 2356 (July 5, 1955); El-Tronics Inc., ASBCA 2173 (Aug. 19, 1954);
Vevier Loose Leaf, ASBCA 1500 (May 28, 1954). See also Atlantic Fish &
Oyster Co. v. United States, 126 Ct. Cl. 892, 116 F. Supp. 574 (1953).
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Skarda, Inc.,103 the contractor was permitted and en-
couraged to continue for thirteen months beyond the
limit of excusable delay and was then terminated without
notice. The Board held such action to be forbearance
rather than waiver, even though changes in specifications
were made during the period involved. This decision, and
others, cannot be reconciled with the bulk of waiver
cases. Futhermore, in some seemingly appropriate situa-
tions, the issue of waiver simply is ignored, leaving the
impression that it must be raised by the contractor to be
considered.' 04 It could hardly be overlooked by the Board
in view of the long standing concern over the problem.
This sketchy critique of the waiver doctrine demon-
strates the need for an alternative formula. The proposal
here will be extremely simple and is one suggested by a
few Board opinions representing an exotic strain among
the general run of decisions. It is based on the very
language of the default article which provides that the
Government may terminate for default under subsection
a(i) only if the contractor fails to deliver within the
specified time or any extension thereof (italics added).
The suggestion is to regard any act of the Government
inconsistent with the delivery schedule-delays, change
orders, permission to continue performance, etc.,-not
as evidence of a waiver of delay, but of an extension of the
delivery date such as is expressly contemplated under the
103 ASBCA 2356 (July 5, 1955). In the EI-Tronics decision, supra note 102,
the contractor was obligated to deliver nine different samples for testing on
February 15. He delivered all but one or two of the items on the correct
date. On February 17 the Government asked for "corrective action . . .
immediately." Then on February 23 the Government asked the contractor
to withhold shipment for the time being pending results of tests. On the
24th the Government terminated for default. This was held to be "mere
Government forebearance."
104 In Hawthorne Mfg. Co., ASBCA 2521 (Oct. 27, 1955), the contractor
delayed for over a year while the Government continually urged him and
aided him to complete the work. The Government then terminated for de-
fault without notice and was upheld by the Board without mentioning
waiver. See also Industrial Precision Products Co., ASBCA 3165 (May 8,
1956); Grosse Pointe Accessory Corp., ASBCA 2656 (Dec. 30, 1955).
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default article. Such extension would preclude the pos-
sibility of a delinquency during its continuance, because it
would, for the time being, postpone the obligation of the
contractor. Evidence of such extension would be found
in the same facts which now are used to support a waiver.
Since it can be maintained that such extension operates
from the time of the delivery date, the contractor would
never have been in delinquency and there is no need for
a finding of waiver. The question of common law damages
for breach is also eliminated, for no breach would exist.
If the Government wished to maintain a right to damages
or liquidated damages, it might yet do so by declaring the
default but explicitly electing not to terminate. In that
one situation the old approach might be necessary, but the
waiver (or election) and the reservation of a right to
damages would have to be explicitly set forth to avoid the
finding of an extension.
The extension approach was utilized by the Navy panel
of the Board in the appeal of Erd Co."° which held, with-
out resort to waiver, that, ". . . [T]he original contract
delivery schedule was supplanted by at least an implied
reasonable delivery schedule, under which appellant was
entitled to reasonable notice before being terminated for
default . . . ." In two very recent decisions there is evi-
dence that the Army panel will also employ this test."°
Without reciting the waiver cant, the opinion in Fitzhenry-
Guptill'0 7 finds that ". . . the parties, by their conduct,
including written and spoken words, extended the delivery
date of the tooling ... ." The opinion is written by the
author of a number of previous "waiver" decisions (and,
curiously, the recent article favoring the election analysis).
If the Government's action is to be regarded not as
1o5 ASBCA 1518 (Feb. 26, 1954).
100 Acme Litho Plate Graining Inc., ASBCA 2878-79 (Oct. 12, 1956);
Fitzhenry-Guptill Co., ASBCA 1885 (July 13, 1956).
107 ASBCA 1885 (July 13, 1956).
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waiver or election but as an extension of the delivery
schedule, a universal notice requirement is questionable.
Instead, the proper question to be decided would be the
intended length of the extension as determined from all
the facts, of which notice or its absence may or may not
be the most important. Considerations of fairness and
equity may be used to the fullest extent without resort to
the mechanical analysis required by the canons of waiver.
This approach does not eliminate the problem of finding
a basis for the Board's power to grant a termination for
convenience where the contractor is not in delinquency
at the time of default, but that has not troubled the
Board to this point. It would, in any event, be simpler in
its application and would be a distinct relief to con-
tracting officers and to counsel for both contractor and
Government.
V
PROBLEMS RELATING TO ACTION FOLLOWING
NOTICE OF TERMINATION
It will be worthwhile to indicate briefly that, in gen-
eral, settlement of a Department of Defense cost reim-
bursement supply contract,' terminated by the Govern-
ment for the default of the contractor, is governed by the
same procedures, and settlement is made in accord with
the same criteria as if the termination were for the con-
venience of the Government. As observed previously, pro-
vision for both kinds of termination is made in the same
clause. In either case, the clause contemplates a negotiated
settlement of the contractor's claim, including a portion
108 The clause pursuant to which notice of termination is issued and set-
tlement effected is found at ASPR 8-702 (3 Jan. 1955), CCH Gov'T CoN-
TRAcTS REP. 1 41,862; ASPR 7-203.11 (3 Jan. 1955), CCH Gov'T CONTRACTS
RPa. 29,371. "Excusable Cause," App. "B," infra, is applicable to determine
whether a cost-reimbursement supply contractor is in default.
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of the fixed fee. Should the parties find themselves unable
to agree on the proportion of the fixed fee to be paid, then
the contracting officer is required to determine such
amount."0 9 Allowance of costs, whether the settle-
ment is negotiated or determined by the contracting
officer, is subject to the same criteria in the case of default
termination as in the case of termination for convenience,
i.e., the cost provisions included, or incorporated by ref-
erence, in the contract."0
The apparent simplicity, and directness of this method
of settlement does not exist in the case of fixed-price
supply contracts or construction contracts. In the former
case, termination under the default clause of the contract'
provides the Government with the right to "charge back"
excess costs incurred in repurchase of the items called for
by the contract, the right to charge liquidated damages
if an appropriate clause" is included, and the right to en-
force any other rights and remedies provided by law or by
the contract, i.e., the right to charge actual damages if
they are able to be proved." 3 A default clause is also
included in construction contracts, but the limited scope
of this article excludes any lengthy analysis of this
clause.
109 The parties may negotiate the amount of the fixed fee to be paid. Cf.
ASPR 8-5092 (3 Jan. 1955), CCH GOV'T CONTRACTS REP. 1 41,809.2. In the
event that the parties cannot so agree, the contracting officer will determine
the amount to be paid. The criteria according to which this determination
will be made are set out in ASPR 8-702 (e) (1) (iv).
110 Relevant cost principles are set forth in ASPR Section XV. ASPR
15-102 (28 May 1956), CCH GovT CoNTRAcTs R3p. 29,856 requires inclu-
sion or incorporation by reference of applicable cost principles as set forth
in ASPR XV in cost-reimbursement contracts of the Armed Services execu-
ted on and after March 1, 1949.
111 ASPR 7-103.11 (23 Dec. 1955), CCH Gov'T CONTRACTS REP. 29,363. See
also Article 11, United States Standard Form 32 (1949 ed.), CCH Gov'T
CONTRACTS REP. 18,305. See appendix A infra.
1L2 ASPR 7-105.5 (5 March 1956), CCH Gov'T CoNTRcs REP. g29,365.
1"3 This subject will be discussed more fully infra. It is worthy of note
here, however, that when the "liquidated damages" clause (ASPR 7-105.5
is included, liquidated damages are expressly provided therein to be "in
lieu" of actual damages for delay.
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i REPURCHASE UNDER THE SUPPLY CONTRACT CLAUSE
The term "repurchase" has some standing as a word
of art to denote the action of the Government under sub-
clause (c) of the "termination for default" clause to ob-
tain from another source.. 4 the supplies promised by the
defaulted contractor. Normally, such action is to be ex-
pected because the Government has a continuing bona
fide need for the supplies. Very often it may happen that
development in technology or design or other improve-
ments in the item of supply may make it desirable that
certain changes be made in the item as it is ordered from
the successor or "repurchase" contractor. Subclause (c)
of the "default" clause allows a certain latitude: "[T]he
Government may procure, upon such terms and in such
manner as the Contracting Officer may deem appropriate,
supplies or services similar to those so terminated." Ap-
pendix A, infra. The word "similar" is therefore critical;
its application determines whether or not excess costs of
the repurchase may be charged back against the defaulted
contractor." 5 We thipk it may be assumed that the price
114 The repurchase may be made from another qualified source of sup-
plies, see ASPR 1-201.9 (23 Jan. 1956) CCH Gov'T CoNTRACTs REP. 29,020,
or from government agencies which manufacture the item of supply or fur-
nish the services involved. For a case involving this type of repurchase, see
Samuel Englander, ASBCA 1480 (April 26, 1954). Procedures govern-
ing the Armed Services in effecting inter-agency procurement are set forth
in ASPR Sections IV and V. The Armed Services Board of Contract Ap-
peals does not regard the acquisition cost of government stocks used to
replace supplies under a contract terminated pursuant to the "default"
clause as a suitable basis for charging excess costs; the basis for this view
is that the "default" clause requires the Government to "procure". If a
contracting officer, it is said, purchased items to take the place of stocks
used to supply the items provided for by a terminated contract, the cost
of such purchase may be chargeable as "excess costs". In this connection
it should be noted that the "inspection" clause for fixed-price supply con-
tracts might permit the use of stocks as "replacements" of items rejected
under supply contracts and allow the contractor to be charged the cost of
such replacement. ASPR 7-103.5 (b) (30 April 1956), CCH Gov'T CONMTACTS
REP. 29,363; Rockingham Poultry Marketing Cooperative, Inc., ASBCA
1319 (May 28, 1953). This decision was followed in Borin Packing Com-
pany, ASBCA 1505 (Aug. 7, 1953), 6 CCF 61,493.
"15 United States v. McMullen, 222 U.S. 460 (1912), and United States
v. Axman, 234 U.S. 36 (1914), are often cited in connection with repurchase
Continued on page 232
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of substantially or materially dissimilar items obtained
under the repurchase contract may not be the basis for
computing excess costs.' But the extent to which the
word "similar" may be expanded is difficult to delimit.
In United States v. Warsaw Elevator Co.," the court re-
marked that subclause (c) of -the "default" clause allows
the Government broad discretion in effecting repurchase.
Certainly, minor deviations and improvements in the
product (particularly where it is armament) seem only
consistent with the intention of the parties and the Gov-
ernment may charge excess costs in such case. Decisions
of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals rec-
ognize the elastic possibilities of the term "similar". In
Hoppenstand Industries Co.,"' the defaulted contract
called for galvanized steel storage drawers. The repurchase
contract called for painted sheet steel instead of gal-
vanized steel and was later modified by change order
contracts in determining whether the repurchase is commensurate with
the terminated contract for purposes of excess costs. However, those cases
deal with construction contracts where the work to be completed under
the relet contract was to be the same as that under the terminated con-
tract. See also, California Bridge & Constr. Company v. United States, 245
U.S. 337 (1917); Schwartz T/A Sun Radio Company, 106 Ct. Cl. 225, 65 F.
Supp. 391 (1946).
116 See Rosenberg v. United States, 76 Ct. Cl. 662 (1933); Doehler Metal
Furniture Company, Inc. v. United States, 149 F.2d 130 (2d Cir., 1945).
A problem may arise where the repurchase contract is originally identical
with the terminated contract, but due to change orders issued during the
course of performance, the repurchase becomes "dissimilar." Supply con-
tracts reserve to the contracting officer the right ex parte to order changes
"within the general scope of this contract, in any one or more of the fol-
lowing: (i) drawings, designs, or specifications, where the supplies to be
furnished are to be specially manufactured for the Government in accord-
ance therewith; (ii) method of shipment or packing; and (iii) place of
delivery." If such change orders increase or decrease the cost of performance
or the time required for performance, or both, an equitable adjustment
in price or in the schedule may be made. ASPR 7-103.2 (30 April 1956),
CCH GOV'T CONTRAcTs REP. 29,363. In this case the fInal price of the re-
purchase contract will not be a fair measure of excess costs. However, it is
believed' that the original price may serve as a measure of excess costs.
See California Bridge & Constr. Co. v. United States, 245 U.S. 337 (1917);
McCoRMIcK, DAMAGES § 175 (1935); Hoppenstand Industries Co., ASBCA
1703 (Aug. 30, 1955) (dicta).
117 213 F.2d 517 (2d Cir. 1954).
118 ASBCA 1703 (Aug. 30, 1955).
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to call for three-piece construction instead of one-piece
construction, different drawer pulls, and various other
items. These changes were regarded as not having ren-
dered the repurchase contract incommensurate with the
defaulted contract." 9 In Projects Unlimited, Inc., 2 ° the
defaulted contract called for war surplus type 1A gages,
the contractor having been informed that type 1 gages
were unacceptable. The repurchase contract called for
both types (altogether the repurchase contract called
for the total known available quantities of both types of
gage, this total being slightly less than the quantity
requirement of the defaulted contract). It was held that
the repurchase was of "similar" supplies and the excess
costs chargeable. Adding to the effect of these decisions
is the decision of the Board in Snap-Tite, Inc.,"2 ' which
follows what might be called the "purposive" doctrine as
a measure of validity of excess costs assessment. The
defaulted contract called for 130,000 Grade "B" am-
munition boxes and the repurchase contract called for
30,000 of such boxes plus 15,000 Grade "A" boxes. The
price for both types of box on the repurchase was higher
than the price for Grade "B" box under the defaulted
contract; excess costs were assessed for all the items
repurchased. The Board regarded this as erroneous.
The only substantial differences in the two grades were
319 The addition of a delivery F.O.B. destination requirement in the re-
purchase contract was thought to require abatement of excess costs, how-
ever.
120 ASBCA 2563 (Nov. 30, 1955). The Board indicated that the two types
of gage differed in their components and maintenance, but not in function.
While the Government could have rejected delivery of the type 1 gages if
tendered under the terminated contract, still they were not so dissimilar as
to fail to meet the test of the "default" clause with respect to repurchases.
It might be observed that the amount of excess costs assessed in this case
might also be allowable on another basis, i.e. as actual damages. "If there
is no current market which can furnish a standard current value, then
the cost of repurchasing at the best figure obtainable like goods, or the
most practicable substitute therefor, so far as it exceeds the contract price,
gives the measure." McCoaMicK, DA-MAGES, § 175 (1935). See 22 Comp. Gen.
1127 (1943).
121 ASBCA 1339, 1808 (April 26, 1954).
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that the "B" box might be made with an inferior quality
of wood and required a band to be painted about its ex-
terior. The painted band established dissimilarity be-
cause it was intended to segregate the boxes for dif-
ferent purposes. Inasmuch as the defaulted contract was
made for the purpose of procuring "B" boxes to fill a
requirement, the replacement contract should not be
the vehicle for fulfilling that need, plus another need-
that for "A" boxes. For this reason, only the excess costs
on the 30,000 "B" boxes could be charged to the con-
tractor. Thus, in addition to being "similar" to the items
called for under the terminated contract, the repurchased
items should be obtained to fulfill the same need as the
one for which the defaulted contract was let.
A collateral problem involves the terms of the re-
purchase contract. The "default" clause provides that
the repurchase contract may be let "upon such terms"
as the contracting officer may deem appropriate. As-
suming that the items repurchased are "similar" within
the meaning of the clause, may excess costs incurred
under the repurchase contract be charged when its terms
differ from those of the defaulted contract? Not included
here are the specifications of the repurchase contract be-
cause they relate to the word "similar." Included are
the remaining terms of the contract: its "boiler plate,"
i.e., those clauses prescribed by law or regulation which the
contracting officer must include, and those other clauses
which the contracting officer may include to the extent he
deems them appropriate, e.g., the contracting officer may
include price escalation or price redetermination provisions
in the repurchase contract. Included also are other terms of
the contract which may vary from those of the defaulted
contract, such as the provision for F.O.B. points, and
places of inspection. Obviously the clause literally con-
templates that there may be variations.' 2 The principal
122 See United States v. Warsaw Elevator Co., 213 F.2d 517 (2d Cir. 1954).
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inquiry that ought to be made, we think, in determining
whether that discretion has exceeded its bounds, is
whether the inclusion of different clauses and terms has
increased the costs of the repurchase so that the two con-
tracts are not commensurable. If they are not commensur-
able, then it would seem that the repurchase contract is
not a fair basis for charging excess costs. The best
reason for this does not appear to lie in the clause itself,
but rather in the generally applied principle that the
injured contracting party must use reasonable means to
avoid increasing the damages.' It is not always true, of
course, that variant terms or clauses will increase con-
tract costs.'2 But in some cases, charges of the repurchase
contractor may be increased over those of the defaulted
contractor. This, it would seem is often a matter of
speculation; one of the real problems is which party,
the defaulted contractor or the Government, should have
to prove that repurchase costs have in fact been in-
creased. One of the predecessors of the "default" clause
provided merely that in the event of termination for
default the Government might repurchase similar sup-
plies and contained no reference to the terms of any re-
purchase contract.' 5 'In Doehier Metal Furniture Co. v.
United States,'2 6 a contract containing such clause was
terminated and a repurchase contract was awarded which
included the "delays-liquidated damages" clause in-
23 RESTATEmEN, CONTRACTS § 336 (1932).
24 For example, an amendment of the "definitions" clause, ASPR 7-103.1
(30 April 1956), CCH Gov'T CONTRACTs REP, to increase the scope of the
term "contracting officer" would not seem likely to cause an increase in
price. Inclusion of price escalation clauses, ASPR 7-106, CCH GOV'T CON-
TRACTs REP. might actually decrease the initial and final prices under the
repurchase contract (although their presence could also cause an increase
of final price). However, inclusion in the repurchase contract of an "ex-
amination of records" clause ASPR 7-104.15 (5 March 1956), CCH Gov'T
CoNTmAcTs REP. requiring costly maintenance of books, records, papers and
documents pertaining to the contract might well have the effect of increas-
ing the cost.
125 Art. 5, U.S. Standard Form 32 (1935), 41 U.S.C. App. § 54.21 (1952).
This clause was called the "delays-damages" article.
'26 149 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1945). See also Steffen v. United States, 213 F.2d
266, 272 (6th Cir. 1954).
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stead. Because of the provision for liquidated damages,
not in the Doehler contract, it was contended that the
price of the repurchase contract was increased as a
matter of law. This was rebuffed by Judge Frank who
regarded the question of increase as one to be settled
by submission of pertinent evidence, the burden of proof
being upon the United States (which was claiming the
excess costs)'27 The present "default" clause, Appendix
A infra, provides that the repurchase contract may be let
"upon such terms" as the contracting officer directs. Judge
Clark in the Warsaw Elevator case pointed out that the
difference in the clauses required a different allocation of
the burden than that stated in the Doehler case.'
. . . [I]n the Doehler case the contract provided merely
that, in the event of termination by the Government, "the
Government may purchase similar materials or supplies
in the open market or secure the manufacture and de-
livery of the materials and supplies by contract or other-
wise, and the contractor and his sureties shall be liable
to the Government for any excess cost occasioned the
Government thereby." Whereas here Warsaw has ex-
pressly consented to 'such terms' and 'such manner' of
completion as the Contracting Officer may deem ap-
propriate. . . Having granted these wide powers to
the government on its default, it [i.e. Warsaw] must take
the burden of showing that the variations actually
adopted by the government Contracting Officer have
caused unreasonable expense. In addition it should show
the amount of such unjustified expenditure; a holding
that its entire liability is expunged is to the last degree
inequitable.
It is submitted that this is a fair allocation of the burden.
It is also apparent that the Government, if it is to be
held to the rule that the injured contracting party must
use reasonable means to avoid consequences increasing
the injuring party's liability, may not charge back a
127 Judge Frank's interesting comment with, of course, wide-ranging
footnotes stressing the speculative aspects of assessing the effect of changed
contract terms on repurchase prices, will be found at 149 F.2d 133-135.
128 213 F.2d 517, 518-19.
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repurchase which is made an unreasonable time after the
termination of the original contract. The problem, of
course, lies in the word "unreasonable." In cases where
the repurchase is made during a rising market, the Gov-
ernment must not unduly delay so that a substantial part
or all of the excess costs of repurchase are ascribable to
the rise in the market. Mere lapse of time is not enough,
unless, of course, there are significant market fluctua-
tions."  The question is, therefore, one of fact. Decisions
of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals have
held that delays of seven and one-half months, 3 ' and
twelve months13 after the contractor's delinquency were
not to be regarded as unreasonable. In such cases, the
Board felt that the principal criterion for measuring
reasonableness was the effect delay had on costs under
the repurchase contract. The burden of proving that
this effect was achieved is allocated to the defaulted con-
tractor.
The statutes and regulations governing the method by
which the Government enters into its contracts prescribe,
subject to certain exceptions, that award after competitive
bidding is the normal procedure. 32 One principal purpose
of the competitive bidding requirement is to secure to
the Government the price advantages that are assumed
to result from competition. 133 In making a repurchase
contract, is the contracting officer required to follow
competitive bidding procedures? It might be presumed
(unless one of the exceptions were available) that this
would be the rule because (1) the repurchase is govern-
129 Union Metal Spinning Co., ASBCA 1892 (Jan. 4, 1955).
130 Metalcraft Engineering Corp., ASBCA 1967 (Sept. 22, 1955).
131 Frederick Alter, ASBCA 1898, (Oct. 29, 1954).
132 §§ 2 (c) and 3, Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, 62 STAT. 21,22
(1948), formerly 41 U.S.C. §§ 151(c)-52, now 10 U.S.C. §§ 2304 (a) -05 (a),
(b); §§ 302(c)-03, Fed. Prop. & Admin. Services Act of 1949, as amended,
41 U.S.C. §§ 252(c)-53 (1952); R.S. 3709, as amended, 41 U.S.C. §§ 5 (1952).
133 See Conti v. United States, 158 F.2d 581 (1st Cir. 1946); United States
v. Brookridge Farm, 111 F.2d 461, 463 (10th Cir. 1940).
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ment action, and (2) because repurchase by competitive
bidding tends to secure lower prices, thus avoiding in-
crease of the defaulted contractor's excess costs. How-
ever, in making repurchase the contracting officer is not,
strictly speaking, acting under the procurement authority
upon which the defaulted contract was based. Rather, he
is acting under the authority contained in the "default"
clause to "procure, upon such terms and in such manner"
as he deems appropriate supplies or services similar to
those terminated.'34 As a means of avoiding an increase in
excess costs, competitive bidding does appear to offer
advantages. Such advantages would be clearly apparent
in cases where, for adequate reasons, repurchase has to
be deferred for a substantial period of time or where
the market is rising. Nonetheless, no flat rule can be
laid down that repurchases must be subjected to com-
petitive bidding in order for the repurchase price to be
the measure for excess costs. In many cases, competitive
bidding would serve no useful purpose, as where the
market is in a stable condition, and has not altered in
the period between the defaulted contractor's delinquency
and the repurchase. In general it may be said that the
contracting officer, in effecting repurchase, must use
reasonable efforts to obtain the lowest price available,
consistent with the Government's requirements."= This
test would exclude repurchase from the highest of several
bidders on the repurchase " or award in part to the low
bidder on repurchase and in part to a higher bidder,
where no adequate reason is apparent why the low bidder
could not have furnished the whole quantity of items
134 See Lester Brothers, Inc., ASBCA 1373-74, (April 30, 1954); Alco-
Deree Co., ASBCA 513 (Feb. 16, 1951), 5 CCF 61, 227.
135 See Army Procurement Procedure 7-103.11 (e) (19 Jan. 1955), CCH
Gov'T CONTRACTS REP.; Langoma Lumber Co. v. United States, 140 F. Supp.
460 (E.D. Pa. 1955), aff', 232 F.2d 886 (3d Cir. 1956); Morton M. Rose v.
United States, 129 Ct. Cl. 715, 124 F. Supp. 419 (1954).
136 See Carlo Borghi, ASBCA 575 (March 28, 1951); Jac. A. Vonk's,
ASBCA 621 (Aug. 21, 1950), 5 CCF 61,083.
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needed."3 7 However, there may be cogent reasons for not
awarding a contract for all of the items required to the
lowest bidder or offeror on the repurchase-e.g. the con-
tracting officer may believe that the facilities of that person
or firm are not capable of producing the entire quantity. 38
In such case, award of the remaining quantity to the
next lowest bidder or offeror on the repurchase would
be proper.'39
An interesting problem in the assessment of excess
costs appears when both the defaulted contract and the
repurchase contract contain provisions allowing varia-
tions in the quantity of the item delivered. Most supply
contracts contain the following clause: ' 4
VARIATION IN QUANTITY
No variation in the quantity of any item called for by
this contract will be accepted unless such variation has
been caused by conditions of loading, shipping, or pack-
ing, or allowances in manufacturing processes, and then
only to the extent, if any, specified elsewhere in this
contract.
Variations are, of course, reflected by proportionate in-
crease or decrease in the contract price. Provided that both
contracts do specify that a stated percentage of variations
will be permitted [e.g., 5%], what is the measure of
excess costs when the original contract is terminated in
its entirety and the repurchase contractor delivers 105%
of the items called for, the overage being permissible under
the "variations" clause? The Armed Services Board of
Contract Appeals has held that in a case of this sort,
excess costs are to be charged on the entire quantity of
137 See Morton M. Rose v. United States, 129 Ct. Cl. 715, 718, 124 F. Supp.
-419 (1954).
138 Lester Brothers, Inc, ASBCA 1373-74 (April 30, 1954).
'39 Ibid.
140 ASPR 7-103.4 (30 April 1956), CCH Gov'T CowrRAcTs REP.
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items delivered under the repurchase contract. 4 ' This
appears to be the correct solution in view of the fact that
both contracts contained the identical provisions. How-
ever, if the terminated contract does not contain the
clause, the result should be that the price of the increased
quantity is not chargeable.
Several other miscellaneous points remain to be con-
sidered. First, because the purpose of the excess costs
provision is to permit the Government to acquire the
supplies called for by the defaulted contract without
extra cost to itself, it seems logical to say that the Gov-
ernment may charge to the defaulted contractor only
the "net" excess costs on repurchase. For example, if
the Government finds that it must make the repurchase
from two contractors, the total amount expended on
both repurchase contracts is the sum by which excess
costs are to be measured. Thus, if one of these con-
tractors charges a price less than that under the termi-
nated contract and the other charges a higher price, only
the excess costs computed on the total of the two prices is
chargeable. 42 The same principle applies in a case where
the defaulted contract called for more than two items and,
on repurchase, savings were realized on one item while,
excess costs had to be paid on the other. 43
Secondly, an interesting problem involves "double
termination," i.e., the case where not only the original
contractor is terminated under the "default" clause but
also the repurchase contractor and a second repurchase
contract is entered. In such case, how are excess costs
343 Vevier Looseleaf Co., ASBCA 1500 (May 28, 1954). It would not be
reasonable to say that the terminated contractor may claim that he owes
excess costs on only 95% of the items called for under his contract on the
ground that this was the limit on the number of items he could be called
upon to deliver. The "variations" clause does not appear so to operate,
except where an actual overrun or under-run is ascribable to the causes:
set forth in the clause.
142 32 Comp. Gen. 328 (1953).
L43 34 Comp. Gen. 41 (1954).
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to be charged? Under the "default" clause and the "net
excess cost" rule it would not seem that the terminated
contractor should be responsible for excess costs if in
fact the contract items have ultimately been procured at a
saving. For example, A Company contracted to furnish
100 items at $10 each. A Company's contract was termi-
nated as to the entire quantity and a repurchase con-
tract entered into with B Company for all 100 items at
$12 each. B Company's contract was, in turn, terminated
and a repurchase of all 100 items made from C Company
at $8 each. A Company should not be responsible for
excess costs."4 The logical application of these principles
would also seem to require this conclusion: if the second
repurchase contract was made at a price in excess of the
first (e.g. suppose that the price of the C Company con-
'44 See Ms. Comp. Gen. B-108570, May 20, 1953, which followed this
theory. Two previous decisions of the Comptroller General had seemingly
laid down the rule that a termi ated contractor's liability for excess costs
was to be measured at the time the repurchase contract was entered: 15
Comp. Gen. 149 (1935), and 22 Comp. Gen. 1035 (1943). In the first of
these decisions the original contractor delivered nothing prior to termina-
tion, the first repurchase contractor delivered only a part of the items called
for, the second repurchase contractor successfully delivered the remainder.
The first repurchase was at a price in excess of the terminated contract and
the second repurchase at a price in excess of the first. Held, that the ter-
minated contractor should pay as excess costs the difference between his
contract price and the price of the first repurchase contractor and the first
repurchase contractor should pay as excess costs the difference between his
contract price for the items he failed to deliver and the price charged by
the second repurchase contractor therefor. In 22 Comp. Gen. 1035, supra,
repurchase was made only once, but from two contractors. Deliveries were
defective under the repurchases and were accepted only at a reduction in
price. It was held that the terminated contractor could not claim this price
reduction as a reduction of excess costs, which were to be measured at
the time the repurchase contracts were made. The basis for this decision was
that the repurchase furnished prima facie the test of market value, which
of course is a recognized measure of common law damages, and that the
reduction of price for deficiencies is irrelevant in determining damages
by that standard. This seems valid enough, and it accords with the general
rule that a terminated contractor is not entitled to claim savings made on
repurchase. Quinn v. United States, 99 U.S. 30 (1878). In Ms. Comp. Gen.
B-108570, supra, it was pointed out that the results in 15 Comp. Gen. 149
and 22 Comp. Gen. 1035 would have been the same "under any view,"
presumably indicating that the two decisions are correct and are to be
followed today, at least on similar facts. Neither case involved the current
"default" clause.
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tract was $14 per item), then the terminated contractor
would be responsible for the total net excess costs in-
curred or, in the example, $4 per item. If the first re-
purchase contract contained the "default" clause, there
apparently would also be available to the Government
recourse against the first repurchase contractor (B Com-
pany) for the excess costs incurred in the second re-
purchase contract (or $2 per item)."' This sort of col-
lateral liability could not, it is assumed, be the basis for a
double recovery by the Government, unless excess costs
have a purpose other than compensation.
Thirdly, if the terminated contractor tenders delivery
of the items called for, or a part of them, after the termi-
nation but before a repurchase contract is made, the
Government must accept such deliveries and, thus, re-
duce or eliminate the contractor's responsibility for excess
costs.'46
Fourthly, sometimes the Government in making its
contracts to purchase supplies agrees that it may furnish
the contractor materials out of government-owned prop-
145 The Comptroller General in Ms. Comp. Gen. B-108570, supra note 144,
noted this possibility without disapproval, apparently thinking that the
result could in part be predicated on the decision in Doehler Metal Fur-
niture Company v. United States, 149 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1945). The status
of 15 Comp. Gen. 149, discussed in the preceding footnote, is thus a problem.
It should be conceded that that decision was reached without any dis-
tinction being made between the common law principle of damages (dif-
ference between market and contract prices at time and place of breach)
and the excess costs provisions of the contract there involved. The price of
the second repurchase contract might, under the common law, be regarded
as too remote to furnish a measure of damages as of time of the breach of
the terminated original contract. Arguendo, this result might also follow
under the current "default" clause.
146 See All-Stainless, Inc., ASBCA 1899 (May 7, 1954). The Government,
after termination, could not be compelled to accept a tender of deliveries
as a contract obligation because the contractor's right to deliver had been
put to an end. However, to reject tender of deliveries under these cir-
cumstances, where the items tendered are acceptable and to insist on
making a repurchase contract would not furnish a basis for charging
excess costs. Such excess costs would be an "avoidable consequence" (or,
as otherwise stated, a violation of the "duty to mitigate damages"). See
RESTATE E lT, CONTRACTS § 336 (1932). It is reasonable to conclude that
the rule of the All-Stainless case does not apply to a tender of supplies
by the terminated contractor after a repurchase contract has been made.
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erty. 47 In the event that the contractor is terminated and a
repurchase contract is let, the Government in furnishing
the materials to the repurchase contractor may have to
incur costs for transportation to him over and above any
excess costs it may incur on account of his contract price.
In such cases it is held that the extra transportation costs
are chargeable as excess costs. 4 '
Finally, it seems clear that, when the Government re-
purchases only a part of the items called for under the
terminated contract, 49 excess costs are to be charged only
on the items actually repurchased. However, in this situ-
ation there is more than meets the eye. Let us take two
hypothetical sets of facts:
(a.) A Company contracts to deliver 1000 items at $10
per item. The contract is terminated as to the entire
quantity and a repurchase contract is made with B
Company for 500 items at $11 per item. No more than 500
items are to be repurchased because of reduced govern-
ment needs.
The maximum amount that should be charged to A Com-
pany is $500. Is this the correct amount of excess costs to
be charged? If we further assume that B Company would
have charged only $10.50 per item if 1000 items had been
repurchased, is it correct to sa: that A Company should be
charged only 50 cents per item excess costs, i.e., $250?
Viewed from the standpoint of common law damages (dif-
ference between contract and market price at the time of.
147 Regulatory provisions related to such furnishing may be found in
ASPR Section XII.
148 There are a number of Board of Contract Appeals decisions on this
point. Among them are: Alpheus Aughenbaugh, ASBCA 511 (April 6,
1951), 5 CCF 61,254; Norman G. Roof, ASBCA 68 (May 25, 1950), 4
CCF 61,002; Wexler, War Department BCA 524 (June 7, 1944) 2 CCF 866; H.
Dukart, Inc., War Department BCA 163 (Dec. 31, 1943) 1 CCF 1003. See
also Manufacturer's Research Corp, ASBCA 1119 (April 30, 1956) 6 CCF
61,929.
149 As, for example, where Government needs for the item have been
reduced because of development of new and superior replacement items
or because the termination of military programs (such as occurred after
the termination of hostilities in Korea).
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breach) B Company's $11 per item charge would appear
to be a fair prima facie measure of damage, and, accord-
ingly, $500 would be chargeable to A Company. Even as
a matter of excess costs under the "default" clause, A Com-
pany is certainly no worse off than it would have been had
the Government repurchased the entire 1000 items, which
it could have done. Posing the problem in a slightly dif-
ferent manner indicates the plausibility of a different
solution:
(b.) A Company contracts to deliver 1000 items at $10
per item. A Company's contract is terminated and a
repurchase contract is entered into with B Company
for 500 items reflecting reduced government need for the
item. B Cqmpany's price is $10.50 per item, but B
Company also reveals that its overhead rate would have
been substantially reduced if 1000 items had been
ordered. Its price for 1000 items would have been $9.75
per item.
Under this assumption, it may be asked whether the Gov-
ernment may charge excess costs at all. Certainly, the
Government had to spend more for 500 items under the B
Company contract than it would have had to spend for
them if A Company had performed. But it was because
of the Government's independent determination, unrelated
to the contract obligations of A Company, to reduce the
number of items ordered that these excess expenditures
had to be made. If the repurchase had included 1000 items,
there would actually have been a saving. No controlling
authority has been found, 5 ' but we suggest that, if the
150 In Press-Rite Metal Products, ASBCA 2263 (March 21, 1955), a
contract was let for some 160,000 safety nuts at a price of $.61 per item.
After default a repurchase was made for only 40,000 items at an average
price of approximately $.865 per item. Requirements for the safety nuts
had dropped off considerably. The Board commented, obiter:
... [I]n the abstract of bids upon the original invitation for bids,
the bidder next higher to appellant [Press-Rite] bid 88 cents per
unit.
We mention this last fact for the reason that a repurchase of
only a part of the originally defaulted number of units might lead
one to a belief that the repurchase price was not good evidence of
Continued on page 245
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Government actually spends less than the total amount in-
volved under the original contract, it should not charge
any excess costs.
ii THE MANUFACTURING MATERIALS PROVISION
One of the important rights acquired by the Government
pursuant to its issuance of a notice of termination under
the "default" clause is provided for in subclause (d).
Appendix A, infra. In addition to permitting the contract-
ing officer to direct transfer to the Government of com-
pleted supplies at the contract price, this provision also
permits him to direct transfer of title and delivery to the
Government of "such partially completed supplies and
materials, parts, tools, dies, jigs, fixtures, plans, drawings,
information, and contract rights. . as the Contractor has
specifically produced or specifically acquired for the per-
formance of such part of this contract as has been termi-
nated. . . ." The items listed are collectively referred to as
"manufacturing materials." The principal purpose of the
Government in inserting this provision is clear. The "man-
ufacturing materials" in the terminated contractor's hands
may be of considerable use to the Government in con-
the Government's loss, as it is a rather well known fact that the
larger the quantity purchased, the lower the unit price may be.
But we see from the comparison of the repurchase price with the
next highest original bid, that the sums are not out of proportion
with each other. It would seem to follow that the repurchase price of
a lesser quantity was not productive of such an unreasonable
variance in unit price that it might be thought of as increasing
rather than mitigating losses.
The case was disposed of on the basis that the contractor had an excusable
cause for his delinquency and, therefore, that the excess costs were not
chargeable. Insofar as the above dicta are concerned, it would seem that
the Board's point was that the repurchase prices were not out of line
with reasonable market costs existing at the time the original contract
was let, as established by the second low bid. This would be appropriate
to an actual or common-law damage assessment. Technically, it might
be argued that the second low bid has no relevance to excess costs on a
repurchase of a fewer number of items. If the second low bidder had
been asked to bid on the fewer number of items, he might well have
placed his bid at a higher figure. This would accord with the argument
in the quotation above.
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nection with repurchase contracts. For example, by fur-
nishing the "manufacturing materials" to the repurchase
contractor the Government may save both time and money
under the repurchase contract. In .ddition, such items as
plans, drawings and "information" may be of benefit to the
Government with respect to its general procurement plans
for other purchases of the same or related items. Where the
contracting officer exercises the right vested in him to
require delivery of "manufacturing materials," the Govern-
ment is required to pay to the contractor the "amount
agreed upon by the Contractor and the Contracting Offi-
cer" for such materials as are delivered to and accepted
by the Government. If the contractor and the contracting
officer fail to agree, their failure is characterized as a
"dispute concerning a question of fact" able to be resolved
under the "disputes" clause of the contract."5 It has been
held that title to contractor-owned materials transferred to
the Government by direction of the contracting officer will
prevail over liens of subcontractors. 5 ' Subclause (d) also
permits the contracting officer to direct the contractor to
protect and preserve property in the possession of the
contractor when the Government has an interest in it. Pay-
ment for such protection and preservation is as agreed
upon, just as in the case of "manufacturing materials,"
and failure of the contracting officer and the contractor to
agree is to be resolved under-the "disputes" clause.
i PROBLEMS RELATED TO APPROPRIATED FUNDS
One of the intramural concerns of the Government is to
353 ASPR 7-103.12 (23 Dec. 1955), CCH Gov'T CoNRAcTs REP. 29,363.
This clause is used instead of the clause at Article 12, U.S. Standard Form
32 (1949 ed.), CCH Gov'T CoN&cats RE'. ff 18,302, in order to reflect section
one of the act of May 11, 1954, 68 STAT. 81, 41 U.S.C. § 321 (Supp. 1955).
152 See Thomson Machine Works v. Lake Tahoe Marine Supply Company,
Inc, 135 F. Supp. 913 (N.D. Cal. 1955). The construction contract clause
contains a parallel provision, Article 5(a), "Termination for Default-
Damages for Delay - Time Extensions," U.S. Standard Form 23A, CCH
Gov'r CONTRACTS REP. 18,202.
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make funds available for repurchase contracts entered into
pursuant to the "default" clause of a terminated contract.
A large number of contracts are entered into under "one-
year" appropriations.'3 Under the rule established by sec-
tion one of the "Surplus Fund-Certified Claims Act of
1949,' 151 a one-year appropriation can be obligated, insofar
as contracts are concerned, only by contracts entered into
during the fiscal year for the service of which the appro-
priation was enacted. Thus, an appropriation for the fiscal
year 1957 may be obligated only by contracts properly
made 55 during the period July 1, 1956, to June 30, 1957.
Unless so obligated, it is not available for expenditure after
the close of the fiscal year.' Section two... of the act per-
s53 A "one-year" or "annual" appropriation has been defined as "one
which is available for incurring obligations only during a specified fiscal
year." Par. 21, Budget-Treasury Regulation No. 1, Sept. 1950. Probably
the majority of appropriation acts provide "one-year" funds. The existence
of appropriations is necessary to provide authority to contract unless the
contract is otherwise authorized by law. See R.S. § 3732, as amended, 41
U.S.C. § 11 (1952).
154 63 STAT. 407 (1949), 31 U.S.C. 712 § a (1952). This statute did not,
of course, restrict the use of appropriations of the "no-year" or "available
until expended" category.
355 For example, to obligate an "annual" or "one-year" appropriation
act, a contract must be made during the fiscal year for the service of
which the act was intended and must fulfill a bona fide need of that fiscal
year. An interesting decision related to this point is 32 Comp. Gen. 565
(1953). In addition, it ought to be noted that, in order to be recorded as
an obligation of the United States and against available appropriations,
contracts must comply with the provisions of section 1311(a) of the Sup-
plemental Appropriation Act, 1955, 68 STAT. 830, 31 U.S.C.A. § 200 (Supp.
1956).
156 63 STAT. 407 (1949), 31 U.S.C. § 712 a (1952), supra note 154. It
should be noted that the act of July 25, 1956, sec. 1 (a) (2), 70 STAT. 648,
contains a proviso: "that when it is determined necessary by the head of
the agency concerned that a portion of the unobligated balance withdrawn
is required to liquidate obligations and effect adjustments, such portion
of the unobligated balance may be restored to the appropriate accounts."
This means that funds not obligated may be used to liquidate obligations
properly incurred against the same appropriation. Presumably, it does
not mean that unobligated Navy funds may be used to liquidate Army
obligations or that funds appropriated to the Army for one purpose may
be diverted to accomplish another dissimilar purpose for which funds
separately were appropriated and obligated. See R.S. § 3678, 31 U.S.C. 628
(1952) (However, section three of the act permits a certain amount of
exchange between appropriations available for the same "general pur-
Continued on page 248
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mitted the agency for whose use the funds were appro-
priated to expend them on a contract so made during the
year for which the appropriation was enacted and during
the next two succeeding fiscal years. In case a contract
made under a "one-year" appropriation is terminated and
the repurchase contract is entered into 58 in a year after the
fiscal year for which the "one-year" appropriation was
available for obligation, the obvious inquiry is: should the
funds for the repurchase contract be obtained from the ap-
propriation charged by the terminated contract or from
funds available for obligation during the fiscal year during
which the repurchase contract is made.'59 Because the
terminated contractor is still under a duty to reimburse
the United States for excess costs and because the re-
purchase contract is made pursuant to subclause "(c)" of
the "default" clause, the repurchase contract is regarded as
chargeable to the appropriation obligated by the termi-
nated contract, that is, chargeable to the "account" of the
poses"). The purpose of the quoted proviso was apparently to permit the
Department of Defense to make adjustments at the end of a fiscal year
without the necessity of recourse to Congress for new appropriations.
See H.R. Rep. 2015, 1956 U.S. CODE CONG. & Atm. NEws, p. 4534, 4536. The
Department of Defense problem arose particularly because of price re-
determination and price escalation provisions in contracts, the "variations
in quantity" clause (ASPR 7-103.4) and other contract pricing features
which make it possible that the amount originally obligated for a contract
may be exceeded by repricing, permissible deliveries of additional quanti-
ties, etc. See Hearings before the House Committee on Government Opera-
tions on H.R. 9593, 7658, 7688, March 27, 1956, particularly at pages 9,
19, 25-35.
357 63 STAT. 407 (1949), 31 U.S.C. § 712 b (1952). This section was
repealed by section 7(b) of the act of July 25, 1956, 70 STAT. 650, referred
to in the previous footnote, but the repeal is not effective until June 30,
1957. However, the purpose of the delayed repeal is apparently only to
permit final settlement of claims now in process under the "certified claims"
procedure set up by 31 U.S.C. § 712 b. The act of July 25, 1956, is effective
as to appropriations for fiscal years 1954 and thereafter. See HR. Rep. 2015,
1956 U.S. CODE CONG. & Aim. NEws, p. 4534, 4538.
158 See 32 Comp. Gen. 565 (1953).
'59 In Ms. Comp. Gen. B-53731, December 13, 1945, the Comptroller
General held that the fiscal year appropriation obligated by the terminated
contract must be used to fund the repurchase contract and that subsequent
year appropriations were not available for that purpose.
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terminated contractor. 360 Thus, a currently available ap-
propriation is not necessary for the repurchase contract.
Under section two of the "Surplus Fund-Certified Claims
Act," a further problem arose: if the repurchase contract 1'
were unable to be performed during the period allowed for
expenditure of the appropriation obligated by the termi-
nated contract,162 how were payments to be made to the
repurchase contractor for performance rendered after the
end of the period? Section two provided that funds no
longer available for expenditure were to be transferred to
the "payment of certified claims" account, and that dis-
bursements from this account were to be made only on the
certification of the Comptroller General that they were
lawfully due. Thus, a repurchase contractor who was owed
for performance rendered after the expenditure period
was required to submit his claim to the General Accounting
Office for allowance. In most cases, this involved an un-
necessary review, because payments were clearly due.
Pursuant to a 1956 statute 63 the amount of such processing
through the GAO will be reduced. This act permits
amounts properly obligated under section one of the "Sur-
plus Fund-Certified Claims" Act to be retained by the
agency concerned for such period as is necessary to
liquidate accounts. Consequently, repurchase contractors
can obtain payment from the agency with whom they
contract even though performance is rendered beyond the
former period of limitations on expenditures.
160 See 9 Comp. Dec. 10 (1902); 21 Comp. Dec. 107 (1914); 2 Comp. Gen.
130 (1922); Ms. Comp. Gen. B-53731, December 13, 1945; 32 Comp. Gen. 565
(1953); 34 Comp. Gen. 239 (1954).
161 The same problem would, of course, arise when the original contract
was unable to be performed within the three-year period.
162 That is, the fiscal year for which the appropriation was made plus
the next two succeeding fiscal years. See note 157, supra.
163 The act of July 25, 1956, 70 STAT. 647 (P.L. 798, 84th Congress), section
7(b) of which repeals section two of the "Surplus-Fund-Certified Claims
Act". See note 157 supra.
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iV LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
No exploration of all the implications of the law of liqui-
dated damages insofar as it pertains to government con-
tracts will be undertaken in this paper. First, the use of
liquidated damages provisions in supply contracts of the
Army, Navy and Air Force is not the general practice.'6 4
Second, the general outlines of the law of liquidated dam-
ages as applied to Government contracts are fairly well
drawn 65 and there is some useful literature on the subject
already extant.'66
164 While the clause for supply contracts is optional, it may be considered
for use "only where time for delivery or performance is an important
factor in the award of the contract." ASPR 7-105.5, as revised December 12,
1956. Par. 41 b, Army Regulations 35-3220 (as changed July 18, 1955)
provided that liquidated damages clauses may be used only with the
permission of the Chief of the Procuring Activity concerned. Use of a
liquidated damages provision in construction contracts is more frequent
(Cf. Article 5, U.S. Standard Form 23A, CCH Gov'T CONTRACT REP. ff 18,202.
At one time, certain construction contracts were required by statute to
contain clauses providing for liquidated damages. Act of June 6, 1902, sec.
21, 32 STAT. 326, formerly 40 U.S.C. 269, repealed by § 1(91) of the act of
October 31, 1951, 65 STAT. 705.......
165 See Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407 (1947); Wise
v. United States, 249 U.S. 361 (1919); United States v. Bethlehem Steel
Co., 205 U.S. 105 (1907); 35 Comp. Gen. 484 (1956); 28 Comp. Gen. 435
(1949). These decisions establish the general proposition that, just as in
contracts between private persons, if liquidated damages are fixed in a fair
and reasonable attempt to approximate the prospective actual damages
and are not, therefore, in the nature of a penalty, they will be enforced.
The fact that no actual damages are shown by the United States will not
result in a denial of enforcement of an otherwise valid liquidated damages
provision; nor, of course, will an after-the-fact discovery that liquidated
damages exceed actual damages have such effect. In one case, a liquidated
damages assessment in excess of the contract price was upheld: 28 Comp.
Gen. 435 (1949); but see Germain Lumber Company v. United States, 56
F. Supp. 1001 (W.D. Pa. 1944); 35 Comp. Gen. 43, 45 (1955). Very frequently,
damages to the Government arising from delays of its contractors are
speculative, uncertain in nature or amount, or immeasurable. This is
most obviously true in cases of contracts involving munitions during war
time. See, in this connection, REsTATE ENT, CONTRACTS § 339, comment c, and
Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, supra, at 411. The state law on the
subject does not govern. United States v. Le Roy Dyal Co., 186 F.2d 460-61
(3d Cir. 1950) cert. denied, 341 U.S. 926 (1951); instead, validity is for
determination under the general law of contracts as applied by the federal
courts. Priebe v. United States, supra.
166 See: Haas, A New Look at the Liquidated Damages Provision of the
"Default" Clause in Government Contracts, 14 FED. B.J. 407 (1954); Ander-
son, Damages for Delays in the Law of Government Contracts, 21 So. CALiF.
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Regulations of the Armed Services permit the inclusion
of a clause in supply contracts providing for liquidated
damages for delay in performance. 67 When used, this
clause is incorporated in the "default" clause, other por-
tions of which have an important bearing on the operation
and interpretation of the liquidated damages clause. The
general import of the clause and its close inter-relation
with the "default" clause are evident from its terms:'-68
(f) If the Contractor fails to deliver the supplies or per-
form the services within the time specified in this
contract, or any extension thereof, the actual damage to
the Government for the delay will be difficult or impos-
sible to determine. Therefore in lieu of actual damages
the Contractor shall pay to the Government as fixed,
agreed, and liquidated damages for each calendar day of
delay the amount set forth elsewhere in this contract;
provided that the Government may terminate this con-
tract in whole or in part as provided in paragraph (a) of
this clause, and in that event the Contractor shall be
liable, in addition to the excess costs provided in para-
graph (c) above, for liquidated damages accruing until
such time as the Government may reasonably provide for
the procurement of similar supplies or services. The Con-
tractor shall not be charged with liquidated damages
when the delay arises out of causes beyond the control
and without the fault or negligence of the Contractor,
as defined in paragraph (b) above, and in such event,
subject to the "Disputes," clause the Contracting Officer
shall ascertain the facts and extent of the delay and shall
extend the time for performance when in his judgment
the findings of fact justify an extension.
Liquidated damages are fixed at an amount specified in the
contract for each calendar day of delay. This amount may
L. REv. 125 (1948). For analyses of the general topic see: McCormick,
Liquidated Damages, 17 VA. L. Ray. 103 (1930); Brightman, Liquidated
Damages, 25 COLum. L. REv. 277 (1925); Loyd, Penb.ities and Forfeitures,
29 HAav. L. REv. 117 (1915).
-67 ASPR 7-105.5 (December 12, 1956) CCH Gov'T CONTRAcTs REP. ff 29,365.
Liquidated damages are, of course, imposable under appropriate contract
provisions for breaches of contract other than delayed performance. The
ASPR clause, however, restricts liquidated damages to damages for delay.
168 Ibid.
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be stated as a lump sum per day, or as a stipulated per-
centage of the contract unit price for each day of delay in
the delivery of each unit called for by the contract, or in
some other fashion. 69 In whatever manner the liquidated
damages are thus fixed, they are valid and collectible so
long as they do not amount to a penalty."' Several of the
problems connected with the operation of the liquidated
damages provision are discussed in the following para-
graphs.
As previously mentioned, vested rights of the United
States may not be given away by any of its officers except
where authorized by law. 7 ' When liquidated damages have
accrued pursuant to a contract provision imposing them,
may the contractor secure their remission? 72 The present
statute provides: "Upon the recommendation of the head
of any agency, the Comptroller General may remit all or
part, as he considers just and equitable, of any liquidated
damages assessed for delay in performing a contract, made
by that agency, that provides for such damages."'7 3
169 See 33 Comp. Gen. 395 (1954), where liquidated damages were the
difference between the contract price and the low bid on the procurement
Award had been made to a higher bidder on the basis of an earlier de-
livery date.
170 See note 165 supra, and 35 Comp. Gen. 43 (1955).
171 See notes 11 and 12 supra.
172 It should be noted that if the contractor's delay is based on an
excusable cause as defined in subclause (b) of the "default" clause, then
liquidated damages are not to be imposed. In case the contracting officer
makes findings of fact and a decision that delays are not so excusable, the
contractor may appeal his decision pursuant to the provisions of the "dis-
putes" clause, ASPR 7-103-12 (23 Dec. 1955), to the Armed Services Board
of Contract Appeals (see ASPR Appendix "A"), which may reverse his
decision. Pursuant to such a reversal, liquidated damages will not be
collectible, the basis for this being that they were not due in the first place.
This is sometimes referred to as a remission. See 35 Comp. Gen. 484-85
(1956). But remission seems to be a far broader term and to comprehend
also a waiver of a finally accrued right to liquidated damages, in a case
where there is no "excusable cause" or in a case where the contract does
not provide that liquidated damages will not be imposed during periods
of excusable delay. For an example of this sort of provision, see Broderick
Wood Products Co. v. United States, 195 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1952).
173 10 U.S.C. § 2312 (1956). The act of August 10, 1956, Pub. L. No. 1028,
84th Cong. 2d. sess., "revised, codified and enacted into positive law" titles
Continued on Page 253
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Therefore, under the statute, two things must occur: the
agency head' 74 must recommend remission and the Comp-
troller General must make his determination as to whether
all or any part of liquidated damages should, in justice and
equity, be remitted. Interpreting his authority under
similar statutes, the Comptroller General has laid down the
following criteria for remission:
Where a claim is presented for consideration under
[this act], this Office has required, for favorable action,
the existence of strong and persuasive equities on behalf
of the claimant. This is particularly true if, as indicated
by the record, the contractor through the exercise of
proper diligence could have avoided a substantial part
of the delay. 175
The Comptroller excluded consideration of contentions
10 and 32 of the United States Code and repealed earlier statutes on which
the revision is based. One of these earlier statutes, thus repealed, is the
Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, 62 STAT. 21, section six of which
[formerly 41 U.S.C. § 155 (1952)] pertained to the same subject as 10
U.S.C. § 2312 (1956), quoted in the text. The wording of the two sections
differs but not in any apparent substantial effedt.
Language similar to that of former 41 U.S.C. § 155, supra, also is found
in section 10 (a) of the act of September 5, 1950, 64 STAT. 591 (1950), 41
U.S.C. § 256a (1952) [replacing § 306 of the Federal Property and Adminis-
trative Services Act of 1949, 63 STAT. 396 (1949)].
Cf. § 707 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C.A. § 2157 (Supp.
1956). This section (providing that no person shall be liable for damages
or penalties for any act or failure to act resulting from his compliance with
rules, regulations or orders issued under the act) was held in 31 Comp.
Gen. 408 (1952) not to provide an excuse from liquidated damages where
the contractor's delay was due to his supplier's inability to get priority
orders, as required under the act. The act was amended so as to change this
rule, act of June 30, 1952, 66 STAT. 306, 50 U.S.C.A. § 2157 (Supp. 1955);
32 Comp. Gen. 497 (1953). The act is currently in effect (until June 30,
1958), act of June 29, 1956, 70 STAT. 408.
174 10 U.S.C. § 2302 (1956) defines "head of an agency" as meaning "the
Secretary, the Under Secretary, or any Assistant Secretary, of the Army,
Navy, or Air Force; the Secretary of the Treasury; or the Executive Secre-
tary of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics." Favorable
recommendation by the appropriate officer is a prerequisite to action by
the General Accounting Office. See 34 Comp. Gen. 251, 252 (1954). Such
recommendation is not, of course, a matter of right as far as the contractor
is concerned.
175 32 Comp. Gen. 67-69 (1952). This decision was rendered under § 10a
of 64 STAT. 591 (1950), 41 U.S.C. § 256a (1952). This statute lays down the
same criteria ("just and equitable") as are stated in 10 U.S.C. § 2312. See
also, 34 Comp. Gen. 251 (1954).
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that the amount of liquidated damages was disproportion-
ate (they amounted to a high percentage of the contract
prices) and that there was no actual damage or loss to the
Government shown." 6
Liquidated damages are not, pursuant to the clause,
computed during extensions of time granted by the con-
tracting officer. 77 The clause provides that liquidated dam-
ages will continue to accrue when the Government has
terminated the contract 7 and repurchased from another
contractor. In such case the liquidated damages are in ad-
dition to excess costs'7 9'and are computed up to such time
176 32 Comp. Gen. 67, 70 (1952). Sun Printing and Publishing Association
v. Moore, 183 U.S. 642 (1902), vas cited for the proposition that where the
liquidated damages provision is a valid one, it is not necessary for the
Government to prove any damage or loss.
177 The contracting officer will normally, of course, grant extensions of
time when the contractor's delay is based on an excusable cause. If the
contracting officer issues a "changes order" (see the "changes" clause,
ASPR 7-103.2, CCH Gov'T CoNTRACTs REP. I[ 29,363, involving extra work
or delay in the work, he should extend the delivery schedule or time for
performance to the extent reasonably necessary. If he fails to do so and
the contractor cannot complete the work within the time allowed by the
contract, because of the changes, an extension will be effective by operation
of law. See 34 Comp. Gen. 230, 234-35 (1954); 30 Comp. Gen. 345 (1951).
In the eventthat the cause for the contractor's delay is an excusable one
within the meaning of the clause, liquidated damages are not chargeable.
See 29 Comp. Gen. 149 (1949). But cf. Broderick Wood Products Co. v.
United States, 195 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1952), where the contract did not
provide for relief of the contractor from liquidated damages where his
delay was excusable. If a part of the delays involved are excusable and
a part not excusable, liquidated damages will, of course, be charged for
the latter. As to the problem of apportionment of responsibility for delay
when both the contractor and the Government are each responsible for
a portion thereof, see Anderson, supra, 21 So. CALIF. L. REv. 125, 134-36;
Haas, upra, 14 FE:. B.J. 407, 421-22.
178 At one time, construction contract liquidated damages provisions gave
the Government the right to charge such damages only when the con-
tractor was not terminated but was permitted to complete the work. Excess
costs were chargeable in the event that the contractor was terminated
and the contract relet. In United States v. American Surety Co., 322 U.S.
96 (1944), it was held that liquidated damages were not collectible when
the contract was terminated and the work relet.
179 The decision in United States v. American Surety Co., supra note 178,
did not have the effect of establishing that the Government might not, under
a clause so providing, charge both liquidated damages and excess costs on a
relet or repurchase contract. See Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v.
United States, 130 Ct. Cl. 490, 127 F. Supp. 565 (1955); 31 Comp. Gen. 428
(1952). The "delays-liquidated damages" clause, once widely used in supply
contracts, authorized imposition of both types of damages. See 41 U.S.C.
Continued on Page 255
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as the Government may reasonably provide for the pro-
curement of similar supplies or services. The language used
poses the problem of whether the liquidated damages will
accrue under this provision until the time when the re-
purchase contract provides for delivery, the time when
deliveries are actually made under the repurchase contract,
or the time when the Government makes the contract of
repurchase. Of the three possibilities the last seems the
correct interpretation of the language used, although no
reason is perceived why either of the first two possibilities
would be inapposite to the situation.8 The conclusion that
the third possible interpretation is the correct one has been
reached by the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals
under the language quoted.'' The language would also
require that the Government not take an unreasonable
time to arrange for repurchase. 2
App. § 54.21 (1952), "Directions for Preparation of Contract" where the
text of this clause is included; United States v. Walkof, 144 F2d 75 (2d
Cir. 1944); Manart Textile Company, 111 Ct. Cl. 540, 77 F. Supp. 924 (1948).
180 The "delays-liquidated damages" clafise, frequently used in the past,
permitted charge of both excess costs and liquidated damages in the e ent
of repurchase, the liquidated damages continuing to accrue until such time
as "the Government may reasonably procure such supplies or services
elsewhere" (Emphasis added). This is open to the interpretation that
liquidated damages are to run until the repurchase contract provides for
(i.e., schedules) delivery of the replacement supplies, and also to the inter-
pretation that liquidated damages will run until such time as the Govern-
ment actually receives deliveries under the repurchase contract. Although
the word "procure" is not absolutely clear, the latter interpretation seems,
on the face of it, more reasonable. If on the other hand, the rule contra
proferentem, and the "duty" to mitigate damages is given effect, the former
interpretation can be supported. The Armed Services Board of Contract
Appeals appears to follow the former interpretation. Racine Screw Co.,
ASBCA 2260 (May 17, 1955). See also 17 Comp. Gen. 503 (1937). The
language of the current "liquidated damages" clause (liquidated damages
shall continue to run "until such time as the Government may reasonably
provide for" reprocurement) lends itself most easily to the interpretation
that liquidated damages run only to the date the repurchase contract
is made.
181- Acme Chair Co., ASBCA 2019 (April 11, 1955).
182 This is a somewhat different problem than that posed by an unreason-
able delay when excess costs are sought to be charged. If the repurchase
contract is unreasonably delayed, it may not afford a basis for computing
-excess costs. In the case of liquidated damages, however, the Government
may not aggravate the amount of such damages by unreasonably delaying
repurchase; such aggravation is within the rule of "avoidable consequences"
(or the "duty to mitigate damages"). See RESTAMMIENT, CONTRACTS § 336
Continued on Paqe 256
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The obvious implication of the Government's omission
to repurchase the supplies called for under a contract con-
taining the "liquidated damages" provision is that the
Government sustains no real loss by reason of delay in
delivery and that no liquidated damages should be charged.
However, the Court of Claims and the Comptroller General
appear to be divided on this point. To illustrate, let us
assume that a contract calls for delivery of 1,000 items on
January 1st and 1,000 items on February 1st. The con-
tract contains the "liquidated damages" clause appended to
the "default" clause. The items scheduled for delivery on
January 1st are not delivered until February 15th on which
day the contracting officer terminates the contract insofar
as the remaining 1,000 items are concerned. Liquidated
damages clearly seem able to be assessed on the 1,000 items
delivery of which was in arrears during the period
January 1-February 15th." If the contracting officer en-
ters into a repurchase contract for the remaining 1,000
items, this seems to demonstrate that the Government
needed the items and therefore was damaged by delay
in receiving them and should be able to impose liquidated
damages until the date of the repurchase contract. How-
ever, where the Government does not make a repurchase
contract, it would seem reasonable to say that it has not
sustained any real loss by reason of delay in receipt of
supplies which it did not want. Nor does it seem that,
strictly speaking, there is a "delay" involved. The Court of
Claims has said that, under circumstances similar to the
(1932); 5 W'IxSTON, CONTRACTS § 1353 (1937); Morton M. Rose v. United
States, 129 Ct. Cl. 715, 124 F. Supp. 419 (1954) (decided under the "delays-
liquidated damages" clause); Army Procurement Procedure 7-105.5 c (May
5, 1954), CCH Gov'T CONTRACTS REP. ff 19,684; United States v. American
Employers Ins. Co., 141 F. Supp 281, 290 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
183 Saturdays, Sundays and holidays are included. The "liquidated
damages" clause provides for assessment for "each calendar day" of delay.
See Skyline Clothing Corp., ASBCA 298 (Dec. 16, 1949), 4 CCF 60,836;
Norman G. Roof t/a Carolyn Clothes, ASBCA 68, (May 25, 1950), 4
CCF 61,002. But cf. Lebanon Woolen Mills v. United States, 99 Ct. Cl. 318,
71 F. Supp. 744 (1943).
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above, liquidated damages can be charged only on the
items delivered." A 1946 decision" of the Comptroller
General indicated that liquidated damages should be
charged on all deliveries delinquent on the date of termi-
nation. Under the latter view, liquidated damages for the
period February 1-15 would be assessable as to the 1,000
items scheduled for delivery on February 1st. Inasmuch as
liquidated damages are (as provided in the clause) in
lieu of actual damages for delay and in view of the fact
that actual damages for delay, may be allowable even in the
absence of repurchase, 8' there is something to be said for
the position of the Comptroller General. The Armed
Services Board of Contract Appeals, nonetheless, has
adopted the position taken by the Court of Claims. " The
Supreme Court does not seem to have commanded clearly
that either rule be followed. 88 However, a charge for
184 Manart Textile Company v. United States, 111 Ct. Cl. 540, 77 F.
Supp. 924 (1948).
185 Ms. Comp. Gen. B-54425, Jan. 25, 1946.
186 For example, the Government might have kept warehouse or depot
space empty pending receipt of the supplies and prior to the decision not
to repurchase. If this decision followed termination, actual damages for
delay seem allowable, if this amount can be proved. Certainly actual
damages for delay are recognized as a separate head of damages. See 30
Comp. Gen. 191 (1950). See also 35 Comp. Gen. 228 (1955); 28 Comp. Gen.
717 (1949); 23 Comp. Gen. 717 (1944). As to a buyer's damages, see UNI-
Pro SALES AcT § 67; McCoamaIc, DAMAGES § 175; UNvFoRMZ CoxnxRcIA
CODE, §§ 2-713, 2-715. Damages to the Government of delay are very often
spoken of as "imp6ssible to assess". The "liquidated damages" clause reflects
this point. See Lebanon Woolen Mills v. United States, 99 Ct. Cl. 318, 71 F.
Supp. 744 (1943).
187 John N. Stebbing, Jr., ASBCA 2204 (Nov. 23, 1954); Jules Segal &
Company, ASBCA 305 (March 6, 1951), 5 CCF 61,245.
1ss The two closest cases involving the United States seem to be United
States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 205 U.S. 105 (1907) and Priebe & Sons v.
United States, 332 U.S. 407 (1947). United States v. Bethlehem Steel Com-
pany, supra, involved a contract to furnish gun carriages, which had been
entered into by the Ordinance Department in 1898 at the time when the
country was preparing for war with Spain. The contract provided for
liquidated damages. The court said, 205 U.S. at 121:
The fact that not very long after the contract had been signed and
the war with Spain was near its end, the importance of time as an
element largely disappeared, and that practically no damage ac-
crued to the Government on account of the failure of the com-
pany to deliver, cannot affect the meaning of this clause as used
Continued on page 258
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liquidated damages under the circumstances supposed
above is an unfair imposition and the "liquidated damages"
clause should be redrawn so as clearly to obviate the
possibility that the contractor will be charged any liqui-
dated damages on items not repurchased.
Following is a brief discussion of a miscellany of rules
pertaining to liquidated damages. First, it would seem a
reasonable inference from the terms of the "liquidated
damages" clause that, when the Government terminates
a contract under the "default" clause, liquidated damages
should not be charged on those deliveries which are not
due at the time the repurchase contract is entered into.
This, we think, follows from the provision of the "liqui-
dated damages" clause that damages accrue for delay up
until the time the Government reasonably provides for the
procurement of similar supplies or services."8 9 The clause
in the contract, nor render its language substantially worthless for
any purpose of security for the proper performance of the con-
tract as to time of delivery.
While this language seems to indicate that the fact that there was little
damage is irrelevant, still the gun carriages were delivered, and, apparently,
used by the Government. See 41 Ct. Cl. 19, 25 (1905). It does not appear to
be a case where the Government was possibly benefited by a deliverance
from the contract, which is an issue involved in the cases discussed in the
text. Priebe & Sons v. United States, supra, dealt with a contract containing
two liquidated damages provisions, one relating to delays in deliveries, the
other relating to failure to have contract items inspected and ready for de-
livery by a certain date. The latter was held to be invalid, 332 U.S. at 412-
13:
But under this procurement program delays of the contractors
which did not interfere with prompt deliveries plainly would not
occasion damage. That was as certain when the contract was made
as it later proved to be. Yet that was the only situation to which the
provision in question could ever apply. Under these circumstances
this provision for "liquidated damages" could not possibly be a
reasonable forecast of just compensation for the damage caused by
a breach of contract. (Emphasis added).
In one view, this might mean that a liquidated damages clause which could
operate as a penalty, where no damage could be shown (as in the case
where the Government elects not to repurchase supplies), should be struck
down. In another view, the court only condemns liquidated damages pro-
visions which do not, as of the time of their making, relate to a situation
where actual loss could appear. It would seem that the latter, or the
"prospective" criterion, is the one the court intended to adopt. The decision,
then, does not exactly cover the situation discussed in the text.
189 Acme Chair Co, ASBCA 2019 (April 11, 1955).
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does not clearly provide that liquidated damages shall be
charged on deliveries which are not delinquent at the time
of termination but become so prior to the time of repur-
chase. Army Regulations have provided for charging
liquidated damages on deliveries due after the date of
termination.' 0 The Armed Services Board of Contract
Appeals, however, follows the rule that liquidated dam-
ages may be charged only on deliveries already delinquent
at the time of termination but not on those falling due
thereafter.''
In our discussion of excess costs on repurchase contracts,
supra, we mentioned the so-called "net excess costs" rule
under which the Government is entitled to recover only the
total amount it is out of pocket by reason of having to
repurchase. Thus, if some of the items are repurchased at a
saving and others at added costs, a balance should be struck
190 Army Regulations 35-3220, 18 July 1952, paragraph 42 e, referring to
the "delays-liquidated damages" clause. The regulations cite Ms. Comp.
Gen. B-86513, May 29, 1951, as authority.
19' See Cabot Mills, ASBCA 378, (April 6, 1951); Needle Arts, Inc,
ASBCA 241, (Oct. 11, 1950); Monarch Coat Co., ASBCA 501 (Sept. 21, 1950);
M. M. & W. Garment Co., ASBCA 370, (May 8, 1950), 4 CCF 60,986 (but cf.
Ms. Comp. Gen. B-86513, supra); Welsh Company, WDBCA 240 (Oct. 19,
1943), 1 CCF 753. The Welsh case was decided under the "delays-liquidated
damages" clause, which provided:
... [Tjhat the Government reserves the right to terminate the right
of the Contractor to proceed with deliveries or such part or parts
thereof as to which there has been delay, and to purchase similar
materials or supplies . . .charging against the Contractor and his
sureties any excess cost . .. together with liquidated damages ac-
cruing until such time as the Government may reasonably procure
similar materials or supplies elsewhere . . . . (Emphasis added).
Under similar language relating to the right to terminate, it was held that
the Government had no right to partially terminate as to deliveries which
were not in delinquency. Sussex Hats, Inc., WDBCA 66 (April 17, 1943), 1
CCF 105. (contract for 300,000 items, termination as to 200,000 items at a
time when deliveries on only 15,000 were delayed). Hence, there was no
right to liquidated damages as to such deliveries. It should be noted that
the current "default" clause provides that the contracting officer may "ter-
minate the whole or any part" of the contract when deliveries are de-
linquent. (Emphasis added). Despite the differences between the older
provisions and the provisions currently in use, the Board's position seems
supported by the facts that liquidated damages are charged for delays and
that a termination notice puts an end to the contractor's duty to deliver
according to delivery schedules affected by the notice.
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and only the amount by which the total excess costs exceed
the original contract price should be charged. It does not
follow from this that a savings on repurchase should be
offset against liquidated damages accrued against the
terminated contractor until the date of the repurchase
contract. Excess costs and liquidated damages are two
different heads of damages; excess costs are levied to allow
the Government to obtain the contract items at the same
price it would have had the contractor performed, and
liquidated damages are imposed to compensate it for the
contractor's delay. The contractor is not entitled to a credit
for savings on repurchase (except insofar as "net excess
costs" is concerned) ;..2 the "liquidated damages" clause
and the actual assessment of such damages should not be
subject to such credit. Decisions of the Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeals indicate that this view is taken
by that body.'93 It would also appear that the terminated
contractor is not entitled to any offset against excess costs
chargeable to him by reason of liquidated damages charge-
able to the repurchase contractor. 4 Inasmuch as a termi-
nated contractor is bound to pay liquidated damages until
192 Quinn v. United States, 99 U.S. 30 (1879), holding that the terminated
contractor could not recover the savings from the Government.
193 Pennsylvania Rubber & Supply Company, ASBCA 644 (Oct. 27,
1950); Sentinel Aircraft, ASBCA 886-91 (Oct. 23, 1951); and see Keystone
Coat and Apron Mfg. Co., WDBCA 456, 762 (Nov. 10, 1944), 3 CCF 38.
194 See 20 Comp. Gen. 374 (1941). The theory of this decision was that
the liquidated damages assessed against the repurchase contractor were
intended to compensate the Government for delay in receiving the items
he had undertaken to deliver; they were not intended to operate as a re-
duction of the repurchase contract price, although, of course, such damages
were able to be collected by offset against amounts due the repurchase
contractor for deliveries. The force of this holding is weakened by the sub-
sequent history of the case. The contractor (Doehler Metal Furniture) sued
in the District Court for the Southern District of New York for amounts
withheld under the contract and was met with a counterclaim for affirma-
tive judgment for excess costs still due. The petition was dismissed but it
was ruled on the counterclaim that liquidated damages collected from the
repurchase contractor should be offset against the excess costs claimed by
the Government. The theory was that the difference between the excess
costs and the liquidated damages was all that the Government was out of
pocket and, since the purpose of damages is compensation, it was all that
should be allowed. Doehler Metal Furniture Co. v. United States, (S.D. N.Y.
Continued on page 261
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the Government repurchases and not beyond that time,"'
liquidated damages collectible from the repurchase con-
tractor on account of his delays in meeting the delivery or
performance schedules set out in his contract should not
be offset against liquidated damages owed by the termi-
nated contractor. Under the current "liquidated damages"
clause, the two periods do not overlap'96 and each con-
tractor should be responsible for his delays to the full
extent provided by the clause.
VI
RIGHT OF THE GOVERNMENT TO
ACTUAL DAMAGES
Like any other buyer of supplies or services the Govern-
ment may suffer "common law" or "actual" damages when
the seller is in delinquency under his contract. It is not
1944) 2 CCF 864. The Second Circuit reversed. Doehler Furniture Co.
v. United States, 149 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1945). The opinion states that there
should be no set-off but suggests that, if Doehler could prove the amount
by which the liquidated damages charged the repurchase contractor ex-
ceeded the actual damages caused the Government by his delay, the sur-
plus of liquidated damages over actual damages should be offset against
excess costs chargeable to Doehler because such surplus reduced the Gov-
ernment's costs. Such offsetting should be allowed, although the "delays-
liquidated damages" clause in the contract provided that "the actual damage
to the Government for the delay will be impossible to prove," and although
prior opinions of the Supreme Court recognized that in claiming liquidated
damages the claimant need not prove actual damages. United States v.
Bethlehem Steel Co., 205 U.S. 105 (1907); Sun Printing & Publishing As-
sociation v. Moore, 183 U.S. 642 (1902). Judge Hand dissented, reaching
the same conclusion as the District Judge. To the writers, the Comptroller
General's decision seems most persuasive; in any event, the alternatives
seem to be either that decision or the decision of the District Judge in the
Doehler case. We are unaware of the current status of 20 Comp. Gen. 274
as precedent in the General Accounting Office.
See United States v. American Employers Ins. Co., 141 F. Supp. 281 (E.D.
Pa. 1956) in which it is revealed that the Government (Army Quarter-
master Corps) offset savings on repurchase and liquidated damages col-
lected from repurchase contractors against the indebtedness of the ter-
minated contractor on account of liquidated damages.
395 Acne Chair, ASBCA 2019 (April 11, 1955).
196 Ibid.
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our purpose to explore the general law of contract dam-
ages in all its complexities; that has been covered elsewhere
in thorough detail.' Our purpose is to examine briefly the
relation of that general law to supply contracts terminated
pursuant to the provisions of the "default" clause. Sub-
clause (f) of the "default" clause9" provides: "The rights
and remedies of the Government provided in this clause
shall not be exclusive and are in addition to any other
rights and remedies provided by law or under this con-
tract."
The broad problem that presents itself in considering
the effect of termination of a supply contract on the
Government's right to recover for the breach by the
contractor is whether or not the termination results in a
limitation of the rights of the Government to those ex-
pressly stipulated in the "default" clause, including the
right to liquidated damages, where the "liquidated dam-
ages" clause is appended. It has been said that termi-
nation of a contract pursuant to the "default" clause
amounts to a "rescission" thereof and that the consequ-
197 See 5 CoRsiN, CONTRACTS §§ 990-1101 (1951); 5 WMLISTON, CONTRACTS
§§ 1338-57, 1383-96 (1937); RESTATEmET, CONTRACTS §§ 327-346 (1932). See
also UN 'om SALEs AT §§ 67, 70; UNiroPm CosrmnixAL CODE §§ 2-711, 2-
712, 2-713, 2-714, 2-715, 2-717, 2-718, 2-720, 2-723, 2-724. Insofar as these ma-
terials state the "general law" they are pertinent to the law of damages un-
der government contracts. However, the law of damages on such contracts is
a matter of federal law uncontrolled by the law of any state. See Avey v.
Leather Products Co., 73 Ohio App. 245, 55 N.E2d 813 (1942), for a dis-
cussion of this point and an analysis of pertinent federal decisions. In gen-
eral, federal courts, when seeking an appropriate rule of damages appli-
cable to a government contract, can look to the "general law" for guidance
in the absence of statute controlling the subject.
198 ASPR 7-103.11 (23 Dec. 1955); CCH Gov'T CONTRACTS REP. ff 29,363.
Note that the contract may contain other provisions allowing the Govern-
ment remedy for violation of the contract by the contractor. E.g., see the
"inspection" clause, ASPR 7-103.5 (30 April 1956), CCH GoV'T CONTRACTS
REP. fr 29,363 (allowing the Government to require delivery of defective
supplies at a reduced price); ASPR 7-103.20 (23 December 1955), CHH Gov'T
CONrmACTS REP. f 29,363, the so-called "covenant against contingent fees,"
permits the Government to annul the contract or charge back the amount
of the fee to the contractor where the warranty is found to be breached;
the "gratuities" clause, ASPR 7-104.16 (5 March 1956), CCH Gov'T CON-
TRACTS RE'. f 29,364, permits the Government to pursue breach of contract
remedies where the clause is violated and also permits it to charge as
exemplary damages not less than three, nor more than ten, times the cost of
the gratuity furnished in violation of the provision. Cf. 68 STAT. 353-54
(1954), 5 U.S.C. § 174 (d) (Supp. 1956).
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ence of such "rescission" is to extinguish the right of the
Government to common law damages. 9 Although the
clause does allow the Government to "terminate the whole
or any part of this contract,""a°° it is not carelessly to be
assumed that these words extinguish all rights of the
Government to damages for a breach by the contractor,
and that the only method by which the Government can
obtain such damages is by eschewing termination and suing
for damages. Literally, the effect of the words quoted might
mean that the contract and all rights and remedies arising
out of it were destroyed, including those rights and
remedies provided in the "default" clause, such as "excess
costs."2 e  However, powers given to one contracting party
to "cancel," "rescind," or "terminate" for the other party's
fault in performance are not reasonably so to be interpret-
ed;2 2 indeed the very circumstances to which they are in-
tended to apply seem to negative such result as well as the
result that the party exercising such rights intends thereby
to give up his remedies at law or equity for the fault of
the guilty party.20 Nor does it seem to us that a notice of
termination issued under the "default" clause should be
199 Risik, Defaults in Federal Government Contracts, 14 FED. B. J. 339, 346,
353-54 (1954).
200 The comparable construction contract provision, "Termination for
Default-Damages for Delay-Time Extensions," Art. 5, Standard Form
23A, CCH GoV'T CONTRACTS REP. 18,202, contains more aptly chosen words:
"... the Government may, by written notice to the Contractor, terminate his
right to proceed." (Emphasis added). Similar language used to be employed
in supply contracts; see the "Delays-Damages" article in the former
Standard Form 32, 41 U.S.C. App. § 5421 (1952). See also the "delays-
liquidated damages" clause, ibid. See Holland Page v. United States 120 Ct.
Cl. 27 (1951); Modem Industrial Bank v. United States, 101 Ct. Cl. 808
(1944); John M. Whelan & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 98 Ct. Cl., cert. denied,
319 U.S. 770 (1942).
201 See American Transformer Co. v. United States, 105 Ct. Cl. 204, 222,
63 F. Supp. 194 (1945), rebutting a similar argument under the language
allowing termination of the "right to proceed."
202 See 1 CoRwnr, CONTRACTS § 166 (1951); Annot. 166 A.L.R. 391 (1947).
RzSTATEmE=, CONRACTS § 410, comment b (1932), contains some pertinent
remarks about the rights of a party injured by breach; these remarks are
made, it is presumed, without reference to any contract provisions. See also,
Lang Co. v. United States, 141 F. Supp. 943 (Ct. Cl. 1956).
203 See 23 Comp. Gen. 234 (1943); United States v. United States Fidelity
& Guaranty Company, 236 U.S. 512 (1915). Cf. UNDrORar COmOMCIAL CODI
§§ 2-106, 2-720.
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called a rescission of the contract with the consequence
that the Government must restore benefits received.204
"Rescission" is used in a number of meanings, 05 but as
used in the case where one party to a contract "rescinds"
because of material breach by the other, it does not imply
that he thereby foregoes his right to seek such general and
special damages as the law may allow for the breach.20 6
Certainly such implication seems definitely refuted by the
words of subclause (f) .21
Thus, we think it may be said that the Government
retains, after termination pursuant to the "default" clause,
such remedies for "general" or "actual" damages as are
available to it under the law. Of course, to the extent that
excess costs are chargeable, this covers one item of such
damage. So also, if liquidated damages are collectible, they
are in lieu of actual damages for delay. In the absence of
a liquidated damages provision, the Government may
suffer actual damages for delay and the right to recover
such damages would seem to be enforceable. 0 8 Other
204 Risik, 14 FED. B. J. 339, 346, supra. Such a statement is, of course,
pertinent to the case where "a party asserting a right of rescission seeks
restitution of what he has given or where the only ground for rescission is
that the contract was originally voidable." 5 WILISTON, CoNTRCTs § 1460A
(1937). Cf. United States v. Haynes School District No. 8, 102 F. Supp. 843
(E. D. Ark. 1951).
205 Besides its use in connection with an action for restitution (see note
192 supra), it may also indicate a mutual agreement by the parties to a
contract to discharge and put an end to their duties under it. It has also
been used to indicate the right of the party injured by a breach of contract
to consider his duties thereunder at an end. See the excellent discussion in 5
CORBm, CoNTRAcTs §§ 1236-37 (1951).
206 5 CoRm, CoNTRACTs § 1237 (1951). And see United States v. Southern
Gulf Lumber Co., 106 F. Supp. 815 (S. D. Ala. 1952).
207 -The language of subclause (f) would seem also to indicate that ter-
mination pursuant to the"default" clause is not to be taken, without further
facts, to indicate an "assent to a termination of all duties arising from the
contract" REsTATMENT, CONTRACTS § 410, comment b (1932). And see 35
Comp. Gen. 228 (1955); 34 Comp. Gen. 347 (1955); 30 Comp. Gen. 191
(1950).
208 28 Comp. Gen. 717 (1949); 23 Comp. Gen. 717 (1944). See also Schmoll
v. United States, 105 Ct. Cl. 415, 63 F. Supp. 753 (1946); Modern Industrial
Bank v. United States, 101 Ct. C1. 808 (1944); American Surety Co. v.
United States, 136 F.2d 437 (9th Cir. 1943), aff'd, 322 U.S. 96 (1944) (these
cases recognize the Government's right to actual damages for delay where
a liquidated damages provision was inapplicable). See also 35 Comp. Gen.
446 (1956); Kolker v. United States, 40 F. Supp. 972 (D. Md. 1941).
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heads of actual damages may be involved, e.g., the ex-
penses of advertising for a repurchase contract,2 or
expenses caused by the terminated contractor's de-
linquency.2
10
Even in the absence of a repurchase contract, it is still
true that the Government may be entitled to some dam-
ages. 2" Where a repurchase contract is made but is not
suitable as a basis for charging excess costs, for reasons
such as those stated earlier in this paper,2' the Govern-
ment has, despite the fact that it may not charge back
excess costs, nonetheless been legally injured due to the
contractor's delinquency and should be able to collect its
actual damages.2 '
John E. Coons*
John W. Whelan**
209 See 23 Comp. Gen. 234, 237 (1943).
210 See 19 Comp. Gen. 55 (1939).
211 At least nominal damages. Cf. UNIFoPm COAU=CIAL CODE § 2-713.
See 34 Comp. Gen. 347 (1955). The Comptroller General advised with re-
spect to a terminated contract where no repurchase was to be made:
"Section 11 (f) of the General Provisions of the subject contract [i.e.,
the Default clause, subclause (f), see Appendix A infra], after providing
for the recovery of excess costs, specifically states that 'The rights and
remedies of the Government provided in this clause shall not be exclusive
and are in addition to any other rights and remedies provided by law or
under this contract.' This section was made a part of Standard Form 32
subsequent to the passage of the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947,
62 STAT. 21, and the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of
1949, 63 STAT. 377, and is believed to have been adopted for the purpose of
affording the Government protection in such instances as this and obviously
lends itself to such an interpretation. While it does not appear that the
question has previously been presented to this Office in such a way as to
call for a formal decision, the rule has been adopted that in the statement
and settlement of claims the clause quoted will be accepted as preserving
to the Government the right to damages occasioned by virtue of a breach of
contract in cases where no repurchase will be made, the measure of damages
ordinarily to be the difference between the contract price and the market
value at the time of breach." (34 Comp. Gen. 347, 348).
212 See pp. 231-45 supra.
213 See 35 Comp. Gen. 695 (1956); 23 Comp. Gen. 234 (1943); 22 Comp.
Gen. 1127 (1943).
* Assistant Dean, Assistant Professor of Law, Northwestern University
School of Law.
** Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School.
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APPENDIX A- DEFAULT CLAUSE (ASPR 7-1031)
(a) The Government may, subject to the provisions of paragraph (b)
below, by written Notice of Default to the Contractor, terminate the whole
or any part of this contract in any one of the following circumstances:
(i) if the Contractor fails to make delivery of the supplies or to per-
form the services within the time specified herein or any extension thereof;
or
(ii) if the Contractor fails to perform any of the other provisions of
this contract, or so fails to make progress as to endanger performance
of this contract in accordance with its terms, and in either of these two
circumstances does not cure such failure within a period of 10 days (or
such longer period as the Contracting Officer may authorize in writing)
after receipt of notice from the Contracting Officer specifying such failure.
(b) The Contractor shall not be liable for any excess costs, if any failure
to perform the contract arises out of causes beyond the control and without
the fault or negligence of the Contractor. Such causes include, but are
not restricted to, acts of God or of the public enemy, acts of the Govern-
ment, fires, floods, epidemics, quarantine restrictions, strikes, freight em-
bargoes, unusually severe weather, and defaults of subcontractors due to any
of such causes unless the Contracting Officer shall determine that the sup-
plies or services to be furnished by the subcontractor were obtainable from
other sources in sufficient time to permit the Contractor to meet the required
delivery schedule.
(c) In the event the Government terminates this contract in whole or
in part as provided in paragraph (a) of this clause, the Government may
procure, upon such terms and in such manner as the Contracting Officer
may deem appropriate, supplies or services similar to those so terminated
and the Contractor shall be liable to the Government for any excess costs
for such similar supplies or services, provided that the Contractor shall
continue the performance of this contract to the extent not terminated
under the provisions of this clause.
(d) If this contract is terminated as provided in paragraph (a) of this
clause, the Government, in addition to any other rights provided in this
clause, may require the Contractor to transfer title and deliver to the
Government, in the manner and to the extent directed by the Contracting
Officer, (i) any completed supplies, and (ii) such partially completed sup-
plies and materials, parts, tools, dies, jigs, fixtures, plans, drawings, infor-
mation, and contract rights (hereinafter called "manufacturing mate-
rials") as the Contractor has specifically produced or specifically acquired
for the performance of such part of this contract as has been terminated;
and the Contractor shall, upon direction of the Contracting Officer, protect
and preserve property in possession of the Contractor in which the Govern-
ment has an interest. The Government shall pay to the Contractor the con-
tract price for completed supplies delivered to and accepted by the Govern-
ment, and the amount agreed upon by the Contractor and the Contracting
Officer for manufacturing materials delivered to and accepted by the Gov-
ernment and for the protection and preservation of property. Failure to
agree shall be a dispute concerning a question of fact within the meaning of
the clause of this contract entitled "Disputes."
(e) If, after notice of termination'of this contract under the provisions
of paragraph (a) of this clause, it is determined that the failure to per-
form this contract is due to causes beyond the control and without the
fault or negligence of the Contractor pursuant to the provisions of para-
graph (b) of this clause, such Notice of Default shall be deemed to have
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been issued pursuant to the clause of this contract entitled "Termination
for Convenience of the Government," and the rights and obligations of
the parties hereto shall in such event be governed by such clause. Except
as otherwise provided in this contract, this paragraph (e) applies only if
this contract is with a military department.
(f) The rights and remedies of the Government provided in this clause
shall not be exclusive and are in addition to any other rights and remedies
provided by law or under this contract.
APPENDIX B - ExcUsABLE DELAYS CLAUSE - cosT aEthBSEMENT coRmAcmS
(ASPR 7-20311)
The Contractor shall not be in default by reason of any failure in per-
formance of this contract in accordance with its terms (including any
failure by the Contractor to make progress in the prosecution of the work
hereunder which endangers such performance) if such failure arises out
of causes beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of the
Contractor. Such causes include, but are not restricted to: acts of God
or of the public enemy; acts of the Government; fires; floods; epidemics;
quarantine restrictions; strikes; freight embargoes; unusually severe
weather; and failure of subcontractors to perform or make progress due
to such causes, unless the Contracting Officer shall have determined that
the supplies or services to be furnished under the subcontract were ob-
tainable from other sources and shall have ordered the Contractor in
writing to procure such services or supplies from such other sources, and
the Contractor shall have failed reasonably to comply with such order.
Upon request of the Contractor, the Contracting Officer shall ascertain
the facts and extent of such failure and, if he shall determine that such
failure was occasioned by any one or more of the said causes, the delivery
schedule shall be revised accordingly, subject to the rights of the Govern-
ment under the clause hereof entitled "Termination."
